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ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RURAL AMERICA 
ANN M. EISENBERG* 
ABSTRACT 
Rural America today is at a crossroads. Widespread socioeconomic 
decline outside cities has fueled the idea that rural communities have been 
“left behind.” The question is whether these “left behind” localities should 
be allowed to dwindle out of existence, or whether intervention to attempt 
rural revitalization is warranted. Many advocate non-intervention because 
rural lifestyles are inefficient to sustain. Others argue that, even if the nation 
wanted to help, it lacks the law and policy tools to redirect rural America’s 
course effectively.  
This Article argues that we do have the law and policy tools necessary 
to address rural socioeconomic marginalization and that we neglect to use 
those tools to our own collective detriment. The Article focuses specifically 
on the tool of economic regulation, meaning government oversight of entry, 
exit, and participation parameters for service providers in certain markets. 
Robust historical precedents establish that strategic economic regulation is 
uniquely capable of sustaining rural communities, and that using it to do so 
is in fact critical to national resilience.  
Rural diseconomies of scale—the problem of higher costs per capita and 
lower demand for resources in population-sparse regions—must be 
understood as a keystone question concerning whether and how rural 
communities can gain access to the amenities they need to survive. The pre-
1970s regulatory regime governing infrastructure industries helped 
overcome the problem of diseconomies of scale by safeguarding rural 
access to services that precede economic growth. Infrastructure industries’ 
subsequent abandonment of rural America during the deregulatory era 
amounts to a market failure because the nation remains dependent on rural 
communities for food and energy production, environmental stewardship, 
political stability, and retreat from urbanism. Thus, for the benefit of all, a 
broader conception of infrastructure and corrective interventions into 
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infrastructure markets must help connect rural America to community-
sustaining systems like broadband internet and national grocery store 
chains. Ultimately, this discussion also offers an answer to the problem of 
the so-called “urban/rural divide”: enhancing “urban/rural connection,” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the country, communities outside major urban centers are no 
longer sustained by livelihoods in agriculture, natural resource extraction, 
and manufacturing.1 Many of these communities are instead weakening by 
attrition as population and wealth flow toward regions with growing modern 
industries.2 After the Great Recession of 2008, rural America fell below 
zero population growth for the first time in the country’s history.3 This and 
other trends—high rates of rural “deaths of despair” by suicide and opioids, 
high rates of rural unemployment, and high approval rates among rural 
voters of President Trump’s isolationist rhetoric—have prompted 
 
1. Ann M. Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and Rural America, 61 B.C. L. REV. 189, 206–10 
(2020). 
2. Id. at 214; Ann M. Eisenberg, Rural Blight, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 187–88, 194–
96 (2018) (discussing causes and effects of rural depopulation); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Losing the 
War of Attrition: Mobility, Chronic Decline, and Infrastructure, 127 YALE L.J.F. 522, 522 (2017) 
(discussing rural depopulation during postwar period, as well as challenges faced by those unable to 
move); Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural America, 
59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 481, 481 n.53 (2014) (discussing recent trend of population loss in rural America 
and young people’s tendency to move to cities). 
3. John Cromartie, Rural Areas Show Overall Population Decline and Shifting Regional 
Patterns of Population Change, AMBER WAVES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves 
/2017/september/rural-areas-show-overall-population-decline-and-shifting-regional-patterns-of-popula 
tion-change/ [https://perma.cc/DRJ9-4YZU]. 











commentators to deem these regions as increasingly “left behind” in the 
calculus of national economic development.4  
The question before the country is whether these trends should be left to 
run their course. Should these “left behind” localities be allowed to dwindle 
out of existence? Or is some form of intervention warranted to stop or 
reverse large-scale patterns of rural socioeconomic decline? 5  Many 
advocate non-intervention, insisting that the rural way of life is simply too 
inefficient to sustain and that rural populations—still about one seventh of 
the national population 6—should instead be incentivized or helped to 
relocate en masse to cities.7 Proponents of this view tend to insist both that 
nothing should be done to address rural decline, but also that nothing can 
be done—namely, no set of tools in law and policy is positioned to 
counteract the worldwide tidal waves of globalization, automation, and 
urbanization that drive these patterns.8 
 
4. See Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 241, 248 (2018) (“[T]he diseases and deaths of despair (suicide, chronic substance abuse, 
overdose) are both more prevalent and more deadly for rural populations.”); Lisa R. Pruitt, The Women 
Feminism Forgot: Rural and Working-Class White Women in the Era of Trump, 49 U. TOL. L. REV. 537, 
564 (2018) (suggesting that “lack of economic opportunity fueled [rural] working-class voter migration 
toward Trump.”). For sociological literature examining rural voting patterns and socioeconomic trends, 
see ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE LEFT BEHIND: DECLINE AND RAGE IN RURAL AMERICA (2018); ARLIE 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN 
RIGHT (2016); LOKA ASHWOOD, FOR-PROFIT DEMOCRACY: WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS LOSING THE 
TRUST OF RURAL AMERICA (2018); KATHERINE J. CRAMER, THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT: RURAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN WISCONSIN AND THE RISE OF SCOTT WALKER (2016); Paige Kelly & Linda Lobao, 
The Social Bases of Rural-Urban Political Divides: Social Status, Work, and Sociocultural Beliefs, 84 
RURAL SOCIO. 669 (2019); see also Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 VAND. L. REV. 151, 
221 (2020) (observing that failure to secure adequate trade adjustment programs to correspond with 
liberalized trade arrangements mean that those who lose out in liberalized trade (mostly rural 
communities) will continue to oppose it); Clara Hendrickson, Mark Muro & William A. Galston, 
Countering the Geography of Discontent: Strategies for Left-Behind Places, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/countering-the-geography-of-discontent-strategies-for-left-behind 
-places/ [https://perma.cc/8YSN-QYCF]; cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., OECD RURAL POLICY 
REVIEWS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE RURAL SERVICE DELIVERY 24 (2010) (across OECD countries in 
Europe, remote rural regions show negative population growth, lower share of national Gross Domestic 
Product, lower Gross Domestic Product per capita, and lower sectoral productivity). 
5. Cf. Eduardo Porter, The Hard Truths of Trying to ‘Save’ the Rural Economy, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/14/opinion/rural-america-trump-decline 
.html [https://perma.cc/8UTV-MUDX].  
6. ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2018 EDITION 
3 (2018) (rural America includes fourteen percent of national population). 
7. Cf. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE 
L.J. 78, 82–85, 141–45 (2017) (arguing that policy approaches to geographic inequality should focus on 
removing barriers to mobility rather than place-based investments); David Swenson, Most of America’s 
Rural Areas Are Doomed to Decline, THE CONVERSATION (May 7, 2019, 7:20 AM), http://theconversati 
on.com/most-of-americas-rural-areas-are-doomed-to-decline-115343 [https://perma.cc/AU3S-DMV7]. 
8. See, e.g., Swenson, supra note 7 (arguing that “what to do about rural economic and 
persistent population decline is the one area that has always confounded” presidential candidates visiting 
Iowa); Porter, supra note 5 (“One thing seems clear to me: nobody—not experts or policymakers or 












As a threshold matter, this Article insists that intervention is indeed 
warranted and that in fact, we fail to nurture rural livelihoods to our own 
collective detriment. Rural communities remain essential to a functioning, 
resilient nation. 9  The full spectrum of rural communities’ worth and 
potential is outside the Article’s scope. But the current and possible 
contributions of the small towns and remote counties characterized by 
greater expanses of land and sparser populations are not insignificant.10 
Rural communities and workers produce the bulk of the nation’s food and 
energy and steward eighty percent of the country’s land mass and its 
associated ecosystem services.11 They are an integral part of the national 
political community.12 In the face of the COVID-19 crisis, they have offered 
an alternative to urban lifestyles that have become newly stressed, where 
skyrocketing housing costs were already prohibitive for many.13 The need 
to intervene stems not from nostalgia for a mythologized, antiquated rural 
idyll, but more from the urgency of envisioning a healthy and modernized 
rural future as a necessary part of an interdependent national system.14  
 
9. Laurie Ristino, Surviving Climate Change in America: Toward a Rural Resilience 
Framework, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 521, 525–30 (2019). 
10. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 199–200 (discussing definitions of rural as characterized by lower 
population density and distance from urban centers). 
11. Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 20, 56 (calling for improvements in 
place-based rural investments and service delivery because of incremental benefits to society as a whole, 
including taking advantage of human and natural resources located in rural areas); Ristino, supra note 
9, at 522–28 (arguing rural America has key role to play in national resilience and is neglected to our 
collective detriment because it is locus of nation’s food and fiber provisioning, as well as ecosystem 
services including clean air, clean water, climate mitigation functions, and biodiversity).  
12. See generally Rick Su, Democracy in Rural America, 98 N.C. L. Rev. 837 (2020). 
13. See, e.g., Ruth Bender, Escape to the Country: Why City Living Is Losing Its Appeal During 
the Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/escape-to-the-cou 
ntry-why-city-living-is-losing-its-appeal-during-the-pandemic-11592751601 [https://perma.cc/S2FG-
HQNV]; Elizabeth A. Andrews & Jesse Reiblich, Reflections on Rural Resilience: As the Climate 
Changes, Will Rural Areas Become the Urban Backyard?, 44 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 
745, 774 (2020). 
14. Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 3. Recent devastating Australian 
bushfires that killed dozens of people and millions of animals provide a tragic example of rural 
significance: intensive indigenous controlled burning practices might have helped prevent or mitigate 
the fires, but the largely urbanized Australian population has been dismissive of these traditions. Jason 
Scott, There’s a 60,000-Year-Old Way to Help Stop Australia Burning, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-16/there-s-a-60-000-year-old-way-to-he 
lp-stop-australia-burning [https://perma.cc/TT7H-9579]. For analysis on comparable tensions in the 
United States, see Tony Marks-Block, Frank K. Lake & Lisa M. Curran, Effects of Understory Fire 
Management Treatments on California Hazelnut, an Ecocultural Resource of the Karuk and Yurok 
Indians in the Pacific Northwest, 450 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 1 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.c 
om/science/article/pii/S0378112719306826?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/7RFR-B5ER]; FOREST 
SERV. PAC. SW. REGION, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SOMES BAR INTEGRATED FIRE MANAGEMENT 
PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa 
/106291_FSPLT3_4291171.pdf [https://perma.cc/9554-UDA9]; Mejs Hasan, Native Tribes Are Taking 
Fire Control into Their Own Hands, WIRED (Aug. 9, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/wild 
fires-native-tribes-controlled-burns/ [https://perma.cc/NLU5-95X4]; see also Stephen R. Miller et al., 
Planning for Wildfire in the Wildland-Urban Interface, ADVOCATE, June–July 2016, at 42. 











More centrally, the Article argues that the idea that we lack the law and 
policy tools to counteract rural socioeconomic decline overlooks important 
historical precedents that are critical to informing a more fruitful and 
equitable path forward.15 This discussion focuses on the tool of economic 
regulation, or government oversight of entry, exit, and participation 
parameters for service providers in certain industries.16 In particular, the 
regulatory apparatus governing infrastructure industries for the century 
from the 1880s to the 1970s reveals the unique power of economic 
regulation to support and sustain rural communities.17  
This argument about the import of economic regulation to rural 
communities has four components. First, rural diseconomies of scale—the 
higher costs per capita and lower returns on investment associated with rural 
service provision due to lower population density—must be understood as 
a keystone question as to whether and how rural communities can gain 
access to the services and resources they need to survive. 18  Rural 
communities’ struggle to achieve economies of scale means they are 
naturally disadvantaged in attracting most types of resources, ranging from 
public education funding to hospitals to private housing developers. 19 
Limited access to fundamental amenities, such as affordable transportation 
and broadband internet, plays a substantial role in today’s rural 
 
15. See generally William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic 
Regulation in America, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 721 (2018). 
16. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 364 (2004) (differentiating economic regulation 
(interventions into markets) and social regulation (“aimed at enhancing health, safety, environmental 
quality, equal opportunity, and quality of life”)); see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (1998) 
(differentiating economic from social regulation and observing unique relevance of economic regulation 
to “six core regulated industries” including common carriers (railroads, airlines, trucks, and 
telecommunications companies) and public utilities (electricity and natural gas)). 
17. See discussion infra Section II.A; see also K. Sabeel Rahman, Infrastructural Regulation and 
the New Utilities, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 911, 913 (2018) (defining infrastructure as “those goods and 
services that are essential, upon which much of our economic and social life are built. While 
conventionally the idea of ‘infrastructure’ might evoke images of roads and bridges, the concept is much 
broader . . . also describ[ing] a wider range of goods and services, which together operate at scale, enable 
widespread downstream uses, and thus serve as foundational necessities for economic and social life.”). 
18. See discussion infra Part I; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 24, 26–27; Janice 
Probst, Jan Marie Eberth & Elizabeth Crouch, Structural Urbanism Contributes to Poorer Health 
Outcomes for Rural America, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 1976, 1980 (2019) (describing inefficiencies stemming 
from population sparseness and greater distances as barriers to effective rural service provision). 
19. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 194; Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 282–
83 (2003); Lisa R. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality as Constitutional Infirmity: Equal Protection, Child Poverty 
and Place, 71 MONT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Pruitt, Spatial Inequality]; see also Lisa R. Pruitt 
& Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 219, 312 (2010) (discussing delivery of indigent defense services) [hereinafter Pruitt & Colgan, 












socioeconomic challenges.20 The question of whether to maintain or extend 
such amenities to under-served communities largely drives the conversation 
on whether rural populations can or should be sustained at all.21 A common 
instinct is to direct scarce resources to population centers that offer greater 
returns on investment for more recipients, raising the question of whether, 
how, and why rural communities can be adequately served despite 
appearing not to offer the “best” use of resources. 
Second, the regime regulating infrastructure industries from the 1880s to 
the late twentieth century showed that measures to ensure rural access to the 
services that precede economic growth were key to protecting and 
cultivating rural communities. 22  In other words, this regime helped 
overcome the natural barrier rural diseconomies of scale pose to accessing 
the infrastructure that any community needs to thrive. 23  The term, 
“infrastructure,” can describe “a wide range of goods and services”; 
throughout U.S. history, the infrastructure concept has encompassed at one 
time even the provision of milk. 24  But much of the discussion of this 
regulatory genre focuses on what were once known as the regulated 
industries, including common carriers (trains, trucks, buses, and airlines) 
and utilities (telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas).25  
Until relatively recently, economic regulatory policies embraced the idea 
that rural communities, in light of their remoteness and smaller populations, 
needed protection from service providers’ unilateral, profit-driven decision-
making, which would tend to motivate those providers either not to serve 
 
20. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 225–26; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 3, 16 
(observing that all OECD countries, including the United States, face a significant challenge to ensure 
“that rural residents and firms have access to an appropriate set of public and private services,” without 
which development potential can be limited; “[w]hen statistics are collected and compared using 
different types of territory, it is usually possible to see if there are differences in the level of service 
available across places. In general we find fewer and weaker services in rural than in urban regions.”); 
Probst et al., supra note 18, at 1979 (discussing biases in health care toward large population centers). 
21. Cf. Schleicher, supra note 7, at 106, 113 (observing problem arising from mismatch between 
state and local fiscal capacity to provide services and residents’ needs for such services); Shelley Welton 
& Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 307, 325–
28 (2019) (noting the question of whether rural communities should be cross-subsidized by urban ones). 
22. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
23. See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235 
(2003) [hereinafter Dempsey, Legal History]; Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: 
Its Impact on Small Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 445 (1987) [hereinafter Dempsey, The Dark Side]; 
Edwin B. Parker, Closing the Digital Divide in Our Rural America, 24 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 281, 282 
(2000) (“[T]he two major barriers to rural economic growth are distance and lack of economies of scale 
. . . .”). 
24. K. Sabeel Rahman, Challenging the New Curse of Bigness, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 2016, at 68, 
70; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16.  
25. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 1327 (analyzing past twenty-five years of changes 
in economic regulation of common carriers and public utilities). 











rural communities or to charge them substantially higher prices.26 Under the 
germinal 1887 Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) and subsequent regimes 
enacted for a variety of industries, common carriers and public utilities were 
bound by a principle of non-discrimination among localities and mandates 
to provide universal service at “just and reasonable” rates. 27  Cross-
subsidization and resource bundling helped to finance entry into less-
profitable places. 28  These protections were understood at the time as 
anticipating and preventing the potential for markets to fail to provide 
sufficient services to small and remote communities; failing to serve such 
communities was seen as both unfair and contrary to national interests.29 
Equitable rural access to infrastructure services in turn promoted the growth 
of local and regional economies and connected rural communities, literally 
and symbolically, to the rest of the country.30 
Third, the deregulatory era then served to prune small and remote 
localities off the national systems on which they depended. Following a 
“vigorous and sustained critique” of existing regulations, reforms such as 
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the Staggers Rail Act and Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980, and other developments in transportation and 
telecommunications in particular replaced principles of non-discrimination 
and universal service with regimes favoring competition.31 Proponents of 
deregulation insisted—arguably unrealistically—that market-driven 
regimes would still serve the aim of providing universal service.32 Yet, with 
the elimination of strong mandates to serve rural communities, markets 
largely redirected services to more populated areas that wielded providers 
more profits.33 After widespread and abrupt departures by common carriers, 
for instance, this transformation left rural communities to “wither on the 
vine” or die “like a human limb or organ starved of oxygen by an artery 
 
26. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B; see also, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 3,877–78 (1886) 
(senators discussing need to account for disadvantages for rural and remote locales in accessing fair 
railroad rates); Michal S. Gal, Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition 
Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (2001); Anderson, supra note 2, at 538 (discussing inevitability 
of decline where “weak cities” are left by federal and state governments to address infrastructure 
spending as a local task). See generally Boyd, supra note 15. 
27. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379. See generally Kearney 
& Merrill, supra note 16, at 1331–32. 
28. See generally Kearney & Merrill, supra note 16, at 1328; Meyer, supra note 4, at 184–85. 
29. 17 CONG. REC. 3,877–78 (1886) (discussion among Senators about fairness to residents of 
interior states in benefiting from equal railroad tariffs, and also highlighting concerns about facilitating 
low-cost export of crops produced in such states for national benefit). 
30. See Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 458–59. 
31. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 45 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10788, 10791 (2015); Boyd, supra note 15, at 727; Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 
U.S.C. § 1301; Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10101; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 
10101. 
32. See Boyd, supra note 15, at 727; Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 454. 












made impassable by a tenacious blood clot.”34 In light of continued rural 
importance to national interests, these infrastructure industries’ 
abandonment of rural communities during this era should be viewed as a 
series of market failures that now warrant correction.35  
Fourth and finally, embracing a new conception of infrastructure can 
help reconnect rural communities to the national systems that they need to 
survive through corrective interventions into infrastructure markets. This 
Article focuses on the rural relationship to transportation and 
telecommunications markets in particular as prominent historic instances of 
economic regulation and subsequent deregulation.36 This discussion can in 
turn illuminate the role for economic regulation of markets allocating other 
important resources, such as energy, healthcare, and even access to grocery 
stores.37 In order for policymakers to fully understand and meet the needs 
of rural communities, the concept of “infrastructure” should be broadened. 
Strategic interventions to correct infrastructure markets that exclude or 
disadvantage rural communities will in turn serve the dual goal of 
counteracting the cycle of rural socioeconomic decline while furthering 
national resilience.38  
Two overarching points contextualize these arguments. First, the effects 
of deregulation are a missing piece of today’s dominant narrative about rural 
decline. Many attribute rural decline to organic operations of markets or 
 
34. Id. at 446, 463 (“Unfortunately, the literature criticizing the previous regime of regulation, 
and applauding the benefits of deregulation, tends to gloss over one of deregulation’s major costs—its 
impact upon individuals who reside in America’s small towns and rural communities.”); id. at 447 
(“Transportation was the first American industry to be regulated and, paradoxically, the first to be 
significantly deregulated.”); Paul W. Barkley, The Effects of Deregulation on Rural Communities, 70 
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1091, 1093–95 (1988); Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 238, 239–40 
(“Any region, which loses access to the [transportation] system, and thereby the means to participate in 
the broader market for the exchange of goods and services, will wither on the vine.”). 
35. Cf. John M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 509–
10 (2019) (providing “brief primer” on market-failure approach, where “market failure occurs when the 
relevant market produces outcomes that are less efficient than they might be,” with efficiency generally 
measured as whether losers in transitions are somehow compensated for their losses). 
36. See generally Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23 (discussing the regulation and 
deregulation of transportation). 
37. Cf. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1620 
(2014) (arguing that “a revitalized notion of public utility—one that sees it less as an obstacle to markets 
and innovation and more as an ‘instrument of the commonwealth’—could play an important role in the 
effort to secure a low-carbon future”). Unique legal regimes shaping sectors such as energy also suggest 
that they are worthy of their own, separate inquiry as it relates to this Article’s themes. Rural 
communities arguably bounced back from energy deregulation more than in other sectors; the 
proliferation of rural electricity cooperatives filled in much of the vacuum left by firms’ exit. See 
generally Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Democracy and Dysfunction: Rural 
Electric Cooperatives and the Surprising Persistence of the Separation of Ownership and Control, 70 
ALA. L. REV. 361 (2018) (discussing the benefits of Rural Electric Cooperatives). 
38. Cf. Rahman, supra note 24, at 69–70 (noting revived interest today in the public utility 
tradition and arguing that historical public utility concepts can be adapted across various modern 
regulatory policy debates). 











other faceless culprits, such as globalization and automation. 39  This 
discussion shows that rural decline was undoubtedly in part a foreseeable 
consequence of a large-scale movement to favor consumer choice and 
service providers’ profits over measures designed to actively sustain rural 
communities and the positive externalities that they generate.40 It seems 
almost disingenuous for a country to facilitate a mass exit of the 
infrastructure services necessary for economic stability and growth from 
entire regions, and then to lament those regions’ isolation and lack of 
economic viability.41  
Second, this discussion is also central to questions surrounding the 
“urban/rural divide” that stymies commentators today. 42  The need to 
reconnect rural America to national systems is discussed here in a literal 
sense as to actual, physical systems—rural communities are 
disproportionately cut off from services like broadband internet 
infrastructure, a utility which most agree today is what electricity was a 
century ago.43  But the need to reconnect rural communities to national 
systems is also meant in a more allegorical sense. Rural communities are 
isolated not just physically, but also culturally, politically, and 
 
39. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 193 (discussing dominant discourse in which rural decline is 
“no one’s fault”); cf. Boyd, supra note 37, at 1620 (arguing that “a broader notion of public utility offers 
a possible normative and conceptual frame for moving beyond the false separation of markets and 
regulation”); Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 132 (2018) (discussing tenet of New Brandeisian movement that “[t]here 
are no such thing as market ‘forces’” and that “the political economy is structured only through law and 
policy”). 
40. See Boyd, supra note 37, at 1620 (describing “sustained intellectual assault” from 1960s 
forward mounted by economists and lawyers that served to diminish the notion of the import of the 
public utility). 
41. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 26, 35 (noting that “[t]ransport 
infrastructure policies have been commonly used by governments as the main means to improve 
accessibility to remote peripheral areas and to promote economic development. . . . [G]ood 
infrastructural endowment is essential to achieve economic growth” and “[t]he availability of certain 
services has . . . become a pre-condition for the viability of a particular place”); Schleicher, supra note 
7, at 145 (differentiating between prosperous regions and stagnant ones); Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan 
Ricks & Christopher Serkin, Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3527055 (noting that the effects of 
deregulation on geographic inequality have been predictable but too often unacknowledged). 
42. See generally Emily Badger, How the Rural-Urban Divide Became America’s Political Fault 
Line, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/upshot/america-
political-divide-urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/9YWB-9BXM] (providing background on the 
urban/rural divide). 
43. See LIFT America: Modernizing Our Infrastructure for the Future: Hearing on H.R. 2741 
Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of David A. Lyons, Professor, 
B.C. L. Sch.); 2018 Broadband Deployment Report, FCC (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.fcc.gov/reports-r 
esearch/reports/broadband-progress-reports/2018-broadband-deployment-report [https://perma.cc/JZ4T 
-F6QW] (showing 70% of rural and 64% of Tribal areas had access to broadband internet compared to 












rhetorically.44 It seems natural, in fact, that a response to the “urban/rural 
divide” should involve “urban/rural reconnection.”45  
These proposals raise several important questions, in addition to ever-
present political obstacles to reform. What about unfairness to urban 
communities and the environmental problems associated with directing 
scarce resources to sparser populations?46 What about critiques of economic 
regulation, ranging from promoting inefficiency and consumer costs to 
problems with the accountability and effectiveness of the administrative 
apparatus that enforces them?47 Does it matter that rural voters tend to 
disfavor government intervention, and that this Article’s proposals would 
likely not be embraced by a majority of rural residents? 48  Even if 
interventions were pursued, how would policymakers make difficult 
choices about where to intervene, given that not all rural communities could 
be salvaged or revitalized? 
These concerns are addressed throughout the Article. Significantly, these 
proposals are not presented as mere altruism for potentially skeptical rural 
communities, but as an important part of a collective problem. This 
 
44. While much of the commentary on rural America today focuses on the alienation of the white 
rural working- and middle-class, physical, cultural, and economic isolation are also deep concerns for 
rural communities of color. Rural communities of color in poverty in the United States quite literally 
experience some of the worst living conditions in the developed world. Philip Alston, U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty & Hum. Rts., Statement on Visit to the USA, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUM. RTS. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?Ne 
wsID=22533 [https://perma.cc/EY8L-PSF4]; see also Maybell Romero, Viewing Access to Justice for 
Rural Mainers of Color Through a Prosecution Lens, 71 ME. L. REV. 227, 228, 234–35 (2019) 
(discussing limited access to justice for rural communities of color). 
45. See Bill Lindeke, Intercity Rail Would Bridge Minnesota’s So-Called “Rural-Urban 
Divide,” STREETS.MN (Feb. 24, 2020), https://streets.mn/2020/02/24/intercity-rail-would-bridge-minnes 
otas-so-called-rural-urban-divide/ [https://perma.cc/4GYM-8LBQ] (suggesting that an intercity railway 
would bridge the rural/urban divide by facilitating travel between smaller and larger cities); Sheryll D. 
Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to 
New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2048 (2000) (arguing that although equity has been most important 
justification for devolved governance, localist strategies dependent on voluntary cooperation fall victim 
to power dynamics that fuel regional inequities); Steve Craig, “The More They Listen, the More They 
Buy” Radio and the Modernizing of Rural America, 1930–1939, 80 AGRIC. HIST. 1, 3 (2006) (“As radio 
helped dispel rural isolation, it also served to convey and reinforce the notion of a single, American 
national identity.”); RICHARD J. ORSI, SUNSET LIMITED: THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN WEST (2005) (development of rail system prompted corporations to 
view United States as unified national economy rather than series of regional economies). 
46. David Schleicher, Surreply: How and Why We Should Become Un-Stuck!, 127 YALE L.J.F. 
571, 579 n.34 (2017); cf. KATE ARANOFF, ALYSSA BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA COHEN & THEA 
RIOFRANCOS, A PLANET TO WIN: WHY WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL 129 (2019) (describing 
“urbanists’ chauvinist fantasy that we could all live in Manhattan-like cities, walking and biking 
everywhere with a tote bag loaded with ramps, smiling smugly at our green virtuosity”). 
47. See Boyd, supra note 31, at 10791–92 (detailing critiques of economic regulatory 
frameworks); Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235, 
237 (2014). 
48. Cf. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 4, at 8–10 (discussing conservative rural voting patterns despite 
apparent rural need for increased government assistance). 











discussion is also not merely a call to turn back the clock on regulation.49 
Varied means may accomplish the ends this discussion insists are necessary; 
if means other than regulation could accomplish those ends, those means 
should be considered too.50 The discussion draws upon K. Sabeel Rahman’s 
formula for conceptualizing modernized regulatory interventions in this era 
of “the new utilities.”51 Of course, any intervention will not be a panacea 
for widespread rural decline. Complementary policy efforts—such as 
increased anti-poverty initiatives, assistance for local governments, and 
planning for economic diversification—would need to be pursued in tandem 
with the proposals presented here if large-scale rural revitalization were to 
be achieved.52 
In sum, this Article reveals that the need for legal intervention to ensure 
better service provision to rural communities is not merely a question of 
sentimentality, or even morality. We isolate and neglect rural communities 
to our own collective detriment. Infrastructure markets that exclude or 
disadvantage rural communities are not markets functioning optimally. The 
persistent challenge of limited rural economies of scale is a central, yet 
underappreciated keystone of this puzzle. It is past time to contemplate more 
robust, modernized interventions into infrastructure markets to counter rural 
communities’ natural disadvantages, reconnect rural communities to the rest 
of the country, and help pursue a more resilient future in an era of poignant 
interdependence. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines “rural,” describes 
modern rural conditions associated with widespread rural socioeconomic 
decline, and argues that diseconomies of scale are central to understanding 
today’s rural challenges. Part II illustrates the unique power of economic 
regulation to sustain rural communities, tracing rural America’s 
development from the late nineteenth century to the present and focusing on 
the role of regulation and deregulation of the transportation and 
telecommunications sectors in shaping rural welfare. This Part argues that 
 
49. Cf. Rahman, supra note 17, at 915 (arguing that historical public utility concepts need to be 
adapted to policy debates of the current moment). 
50. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 12 (suggesting that “we should not assume 
that only one type of service provider can provide a specific service”); see also Boyd, supra note 15, at 
728 (contemplating whether “ideas of just price or public utility or economic justice could . . . be 
refashioned and redeployed in the face of current challenges”). 
51. K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival 
of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668–69 (2018). 
52. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 220, 238 (advocating increased external support for rural local 
governments to provide basic services like building code enforcement); Eisenberg, supra note 1, 198–
99 (advocating fairer allocations of resources to rural communities, including more robust anti-poverty 
efforts in light of rural poverty’s disproportionately chronic nature); Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 330 (2019) (calling for sustainable economic diversification initiatives in rural 












infrastructure industries’ abandonment of rural communities in the 
deregulatory era amounts to a series of market failures because of how this 
abandonment undermined the many important positive externalities 
associated with rural development. Part III argues that in light of ongoing 
rural importance to national interests, more robust consideration of 
modernized market-correcting mechanisms is warranted for nurturing rural 
communities’ economic growth and well-being, not just for transportation 
and telecommunications, but also for other markets that exclude and 
disadvantage rural communities. This Part proposes a broader conception 
of the idea of “infrastructure” and offers a normative assessment of how 
such interventions might be pursued. 
I. RURAL CONDITIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
A. Rural Socioeconomic Decline 
The question of the costs and benefits associated with a rural way of life 
has taken on some increased urgency of late. Rural communities’ dramatic, 
consistent declines in population and increases in socioeconomic problems 
such as suicide, opioid addiction, and unemployment have all contributed 
to a desire to understand what factors drive these phenomena and whether 
they can or should be reversed or mitigated.53 After the 2016 election of 
President Trump, commentary sought to understand his popularity with 
white rural voters, bringing more attention to the “urban/rural divide” 
associated with a wide set of issues ranging from racial polarization to 
disparate access to technology.54 
Although rural localities are diverse and variable—and it is important 
not to fall into the trap of characterizing rural America as “a monolith in a 
perpetual state of decline”55—certain trends can be seen across rural places. 
The annual report of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic 
Research Service, Rural America at a Glance, describes today’s rural 
socioeconomic challenges. 56  The Report first defines rural as 
“nonmetropolitan,” (nonmetro) a designation estimated to encompass 46.1 
 
53. See Hendrickson, Muro & Galston, supra note 4; ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 
4, at 11 (noting that “[w]hile there has been a longstanding interest in rural services, the severity and 
persistence of the recession has made the issue even more important. . . . [R]ural areas have been largely 
left to adjust to the recession on the basis of their own resources,” even though they may be more 
dependent on public support for services). 
54. See James Fallows, The Rural-Urban Divide Is More Complicated Than You Think, THE 
ATL. (May 28, 2019, 11:48 AM), https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2019/05/rural-urban-divide-more-
complicated-you-think/590326/ [https://perma.cc/U2NM-QCTE]. 
55. Ristino, supra note 9, at 528. 
56. ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE: 2019 EDITION 
(2019). 











million residents as of 2018, or 14.1 percent of the national population.57 
This designation applies to places that have “some combination of: 1. open 
countryside, 2. rural towns (places with fewer than 2,500 people), and 3. 
urban areas with populations ranging from 2,500 to 49,999 that are not part 
of larger labor market areas (metropolitan areas).”58 Counties designated 
nonmetro can therefore contain substantial urban populations or be adjacent 
to urban centers.59 From 2010 to 2018, populations grew in metropolitan 
(metro) counties and in nonmetro counties containing urban populations, 
while population declined in nonmetro counties without urban 
populations.60 Everywhere saw employment growth except for nonmetro 
counties that lacked urban populations and were not adjacent to metro 
areas.61 Growth was substantially slower in nonmetro counties generally. 
The Report continues: 
In addition to slower population growth, lower rates of labor force 
participation in nonmetro areas—due to an older, less educated 
population that is more likely to be disabled—also contributed to 
slower employment growth in nonmetro than in metro areas. Poverty 
rates are highest in the most rural, isolated settings, and the gap 
between poverty rates in these and other settings has grown. . . .  
 Real personal income per person (PIPP) was significantly higher 
and grew faster in metro counties than in nonmetro counties during 
2010–17.62  
In an effort to capture how these trends are distributed with more nuance, 
sociologists Lawrence Hamilton et al. have suggested that today there are 
“four rural Americas,” only one of which is prosperous. Those categories 
include (1) amenity-rich rural America; (2) chronically poor rural America; 
(3) resource-dependent, declining rural America; and (4) mixed 
amenity/decline rural America.63 Underlying all of these categories is the 
question of whether and how rural communities have economic activity to 
sustain them. Amenity-rich rural America—which includes communities 
that enjoy “natural splendor,” tourism activity, relative proximity to urban 
centers, and higher property values—is in a better position to sustain 
 
57. Id. at 1–2. 
58. Rural Classifications: Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.: ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.er 
s.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-classifications/ [https://perma.cc/7W99-GHPJ]. 
59. ECON. RSCH. SERV., supra note 56, at 1. 
60. Id. at 2. 
61. Id. at 2–3. 
62. Id. at 1. 
63. LAWRENCE C. HAMILTON, LESLIE R. HAMILTON, CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN & CHRIS R. 













regional economic activity than its counterparts, while challenges with 
sustainable economic activity characterize the other three categories.64 
The second and third categories—declining resource-dependent 
communities and communities suffering from chronic poverty—are 
arguably the most distressed and in need of attention today. These types of 
communities share some overlapping characteristics and some important 
differences. Resource-dependent communities in decline would include the 
timbering communities of the Pacific Northwest and deindustrializing 
regions of the Midwest. These communities have mostly conservative, 
white populations whose families have resided locally for multiple 
generations.65 Communities struggling with chronic poverty, by contrast, 
mostly include populations of color. These populations are concentrated in 
African-American communities in the South, Native American reservations 
in the West, and fast-growing Latinx communities throughout the country, 
in addition to the majority-white populations of Appalachia.66  
Although these categories of distressed rural localities may seem 
fundamentally different in some ways, two points are worth noting. First, 
white rural residents receive the lion’s share of attention in the public 
discourse about “rural America.”67 But rural populations of color dealing 
with chronic poverty quite literally experience some of the worst living 
conditions in the developed world. 68  Second, resource-dependent rural 
communities may seem relatively privileged; they, at least, had something 
to lose in the first place by way of robust economic activity, unlike the 
chronically impoverished communities. But the logical conclusion of 
declining to intervene to mitigate or counteract these trends is that 
communities in decline are on track to become chronically impoverished if 
nothing is done. Across both categories, these populations are struggling 
with substance abuse and mental health crises, high rates of unemployment, 
and difficulty accessing services necessary to meet basic needs ranging from 
healthcare to clean drinking water to libraries to building code 
enforcement.69 
The town of Cairo, Illinois, provides an illustrative example of what rural 
distress can look like today. Cairo’s population was once 15,000, and it 
grew and was constructed as a home for 15,000 people living at a hub of 
river commerce.70 Cairo suffered as a result of competition from railway 
and highway traffic and the loss of its largest employer, the Burkart Foam 
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 6–17. 
66. Id. at 4, 15. 
67. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 191. 
68. See Alston, supra note 44. 
69. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 187–94. 
70. Id. at 188. 











Company. 71  Today, Cairo’s population hovers just above 2,000. The 
majority-Black residents have had to deal with a proliferation of empty and 
dilapidated buildings, the closure of the town’s last grocery store in 2015, 
and the condemnation of the town’s last public housing complex in 2017.72 
Meanwhile, the prospect of local residents attracting new services and 
amenities, like a new public housing complex, seems grim in light of the 
lack of incentives for providers and developers. 
A common proposal to address these problems is that, instead of 
pursuing place-based policies, rural residents should relocate to regions with 
more resources.73 Where barriers to mobility exist, our focus should, it is 
argued, be on removing those barriers, rather than on efforts to revitalize 
distressed places. Of course, removing barriers to mobility would keep those 
seeking to relocate from being tethered to localities where they do not want 
to be.74 But failing to acknowledge rural marginalization as a problem, and 
a structural one that should be addressed, raises troubling ethical, political, 
and logistical implications.75 It is not clear, for instance, that a better life 
awaits residents relocating to cities, where housing costs and other 
challenges—most recently including the pandemic-related dangers 
associated with population density—may simply bring new forms of 
suffering. 76  Although the prospect of attempting wholesale rural 
 
71. Id. at 194–95. 
72. Id. at 195–96; see also Kirk Siegler, ‘Nobody Cares About Cairo’: Residents of Shrinking 
River Town Fight to Bring It Back, NPR (June 16, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/16/618 
959048/nobody-cares-about-cairo-residents-of-shrinking-river-town-fight-to-bring-it-bac [https://perm 
a.cc/T37P-74W4]; Kirk Siegler, Saving Cairo: A Once Thriving River Town Finds Itself On Life 
Support, NPR (June 4, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/04/528650995/saving-cairo-a-onc 
e-thriving-river-town-finds-itself-on-life-support [https://perma.cc/K5SJ-7AZ]. 
73. See The “Just Move” Argument: Reflections on Distributive Justice, Mobility, and Rural 
America, YOUTH CIRCULATIONS (Feb. 26, 2020), http://www.youthcirculations.com/blog/2020/2/26/th 
e-just-move-argument-reflections-on-distributive-justice-mobility-and-rural-america [https://perma.cc/ 
YG8Y-Z7XN] (referring to “the pervasive public claim that rural individuals should ‘just move’”).  
74. Cf. Sara Pratt, Civil Rights Strategies to Increase Mobility, 127 YALE L.J.F. 498 (2017) 
(acknowledging importance of mobility to reducing concentrated poverty and segregation). 
75. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 542 (arguing that increasing geographic mobility is not 
enough to address rising social inequality and calling for “new antipoverty agenda” and investments in 
basic infrastructure in declining regions); Sheila R. Foster, The Limits of Mobility and the Persistence 
of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J.F. 480, 487–90, 496–97 (2017) (discussing growing inequality within 
metro regions that makes migration from struggling regions to megacities less desirable than it may 
seem and questioning efficacy of “federal interventions that simply move people around”); Naomi 
Schoenbaum, Stuck or Rooted? The Costs of Mobility and the Value of Place, 127 YALE L.J.F. 458, 479 
(2017) (discussing being “strongly embedded” in a community as explaining choices not to move, as 
opposed to more negative connotation of being “stuck”). 
76. See David Montgomery, The Neighborhoods Where Housing Costs Devour Budgets, 
BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Apr. 4, 2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-
04/mapping-where-housing-costs-hit-budgets-the-most [https://perma.cc/2VCR-RQQV] (detailing 
problems in both rural and urban areas); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Interstate Trucking: The Collision of 













revitalization may be both daunting and complicated, it is also problematic 
to treat rural marginalization as nature simply running its course.77 
At the broadest level, the discourse on rural communities today, in light 
of their increasingly distressed conditions, seeks to understand how these 
conditions came to be and what could be done to address them. The next 
sections seek to illuminate those questions by linking today’s rural 
conditions to the fundamental question of rural economies of scale. 
Critically, this discourse has neglected the country’s past efforts to account 
for rural diseconomies of scale and prevent the very form of rural stagnancy 
that we see today; in turn, then, the solution to rural marginalization must 
involve the question of rural diseconomies of scale. 
B. Rural Diseconomies of Scale 
The discussion in this section focuses on two important characteristics 
of rurality: remoteness from an urban center and relatively low population 
density. 78  Although definitions vary, the commonly understood 
characteristic of rural communities is that they have relatively few people 
living in a place that is relatively far from a population center and its 
associated amenities. 79  For example, consistent with the Department of 
Agriculture, the U.S. Census Bureau defines “rural” as anything that is not 
“urban,” with “urbanized areas” defined as having a population of 50,000 
or more, and “urban clusters” as having a population of between 2,500 and 
50,000.80 Of course, small urban centers and urban clusters, including towns 
with just a few thousand residents, may face issues similar to communities 
officially designated as rural. The proportion of people living in places 
designated as rural has dropped dramatically over the course of the past 
hundred years; the rural population was approximately sixty percent of the 
national population as of 1900, and today it is about fourteen percent.81 
 
industry resulted in increased isolation of rural residents from “society at large,” and though “[a]n 
alternative for some elderly people is to move away from their homes in rural areas to an urban area . . . 
they no longer have the support of their local community network and . . . may require the support of 
human services agencies to remain independent.” (quoting EILEEN S. STOMMES, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
RECONNECTING RURAL AMERICA: REPORT ON RURAL INTERCITY PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 31 
(1989)). 
77. Cf. Swenson, supra note 7 (arguing that policymakers should “seriously consider the fact that 
most rural areas will not grow”). 
78. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 199–200. 
79. Id. 
80. How Does the U.S. Census Bureau Define “Rural?”, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: RURAL AM., htt 
ps://gis-portal.data.census.gov/arcgis/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7a41374f6b03456e9d138cb0 
14711e01 [https://perma.cc/YF7P-9FSJ]. 
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OF AGRIC., THE 20TH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 3 (2005), 
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WA2W-8ZJG]. 











Nonetheless, rural communities have faced consistent tensions in the 
context of their economic development, whether the community in question 
existed a century ago or today. Namely, by their nature, it is more difficult 
to form economies of scale in rural communities due to their low population 
density and remoteness from other economic activity.82 This in turn means 
that it is more difficult for rural communities to attract resources because 
they offer less in exchange, whether in the form of profits or other forms of 
return on investment. 83  Rural diseconomies of scale catalyze the 
socioeconomic problems described above because residents have more 
limited access to services that could help address that distress.84 The rural 
opioid crisis, for example, is exacerbated by more limited rural access to 
doctors.85 In turn, the idea that rural America is too expensive to sustain 
shapes arguments that it is not worth intervening to counteract today’s rural 
socioeconomic challenges.86 
Commentators often refer to rural diseconomies of scale as an obstacle 
to rural development or service provision, but few have sought to explore 
this issue in more depth.87 “Economies of scale” literature gained traction in 
the mid-twentieth century and originally focused on optimizing production 
levels within private enterprises.88 Put simply, the idea is that the smaller 
the level of production is for a particular good or service, the more costs per 
unit the production will entail.89 Producing a higher volume, up to a point, 
 
82. Pruitt, Spatial Inequality, supra note 19, at 6; Pruitt & Showman, supra note 2, at 475, 501; 
Deirdre Purdy, Note, An Economical, Thorough and Efficient School System and the West Virginia 
School Building Authority “Economy of Scale” Numbers, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 175, 178–79 (1996); 
Theodore J. Fetter, Improving Court Operations in Rural Areas, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (1982). 
83. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 18 (“Private services are made available 
when the service provider can operate at a profit. This means that there has to be enough demand by 
consumers to cover the cost of providing the service. In rural areas the private sector is less able to 
provide services that are readily available in urban settings.”). 
84. Eisenberg, supra note 2 (describing the downward socioeconomic spiral that can occur when 
economies of scale start to unravel due to population loss); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 
4, at 24 (“Although some urban residents do not have access to specific services, particularly if they are 
provided through the market on a user pay basis, most services are generally available to urban residents 
in all income classes. On the other hand, in many rural areas, especially the more remote, certain services 
are not available, or are available at considerably higher cost and/or lower quality than in urban 
locations.”). 
85. Amid Rural Doctor Shortage, Dozens Of Medical Workers Charged in Opioid Crackdown, 
NPR (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/20/715533601/amid-rural-doctor-shortage-dozens-
of-medical-workers-charged-in-opioid-crackdown [https://perma.cc/W89A-RDHT]. 
86. Porter, supra note 5. 
87. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 19, at 283 n.26; Pruitt & Showman, supra note 2, at 475. 
88. Robert J. Tholkes & Charles H. Sederberg, Economies of Scale and Rural Schools, RSCH. 
RURAL EDUC., Fall 1990, at 9, 10–13 (providing review of literature on economies of scale from the 
1950s through 1990); see also George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. & ECON. 54 (1958). 
89. Purdy, supra note 82, at 189 (summarizing economies of scale concept as idea that “a larger 
factory will produce cheaper widgets,” but questioning the concept’s applicability to schools); Fetter, 













means a more efficient use of resources.90 Thus, businesses “must operate 
at the optimum size” in order to “obtain maximum economies of scale.”91 
A simple example of this might be the labor and expenses a baker would 
put into making a single cookie—still having to buy and measure all of the 
ingredients in bulk, mix them, shape the cookie, and bake the cookie—
versus making an entire batch of cookies with only the slightly heightened 
proportionate amount of labor, mostly directed to shaping additional 
cookies.  
A “diseconomy of scale,” by contrast, exists when the average cost of 
production increases with increased output. 92  Rural population scarcity 
builds additional costs into the provision of virtually any product or service 
because of the costs associated with distance, such as needing to traverse 
the distance and increased uncertainty associated with that distance.93 On 
the other side of that coin, because rural populations are more limited, there 
are fewer consumers to offset those higher costs, meaning rural 
diseconomies of scale will be more likely in most types of economic 
activity.94 Drawing upon the cookie example, it would be as if the baker 
making the cookies had thirty customers for dozens of cookies within one 
mile, but then had to drive a small amount of cookies ten miles away for 
two customers; those latter customers do not necessarily seem worth the 
additional costs due to their diseconomies of scale for the cookies. 
Thus, in the private sector, most companies would prefer to direct their 
services to urban centers because they can offer their products at a higher 
volume with lower relative costs.95 Of course, urban communities, simply 
by having more people, also offer more demand for products. So, for 
example, a private internet service provider would want to establish itself to 
serve an urban community not just because the urban community would 
offer more consumers, but also because the provider would make a more 
 
achieving efficient use of resources, and often favors consolidation of resources); Donald J. Boudreaux 
& Roger Meiners, Externality: Origins and Classifications, 59 NAT. RES. J. 1, 4 (2019); Bradley T. 
Borden, Taxing Shared Economies of Scale, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 721, 722–23 (2009) (describing the 
“cost-reducing potential of economies of scale” as “the decline in average cost per-unit as output rises”). 
90. Borden, supra note 89, at 724–25 (noting that production at too high a level produces 
diseconomies of scale). 
91. Id. at 723. 
92. Id. at 724. 
93. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 25–26 (discussing higher costs per capita in 
smaller communities and increased costs associated with service provision to remote localities). 
94. See id. at 3 (noting “delivering any particular service” is “more expensive in a rural location 
than in urban centres” because of lower population density, larger distances to travel, and smaller 
numbers of people that preclude economies of scale). 
95. Cf. Borden, supra note 89, at 722–23 (noting businesses’ motivations to create economies of 
scale due to their cost-reducing potential from decline in average cost per-unit as output rises). 











efficient use of its own resources in yielding higher returns per capita.96 
Once a provider achieves a level of production and consumption that can be 
sustained, that threshold is considered to be “at scale.” When it comes to 
industries with high fixed costs, such as the installation of permanent 
infrastructure fixtures, the prospect of rural investments seems all the less 
appealing.97 
The aspiration to achieve economies of scale also arises in the context of 
public and quasi-public amenities, such as schools and hospitals. 98 
Although schools and hospitals do not produce the goods initially 
contemplated by this theory, they do have outputs and operating costs.99 The 
idea here, too, is that more output will tend to make for more efficient use 
of costs. Thus, a rural school or hospital that serves three people would 
likely be considered not “at scale.”100 The principle of the economy of scale 
favors consolidation, at least to an extent.101  
When the question of “economies of scale” is applied to rural 
communities as a whole, their very existence—and the question of whether 
the broader community should support them—seems called into question.102 
Those who emphasize the primacy of economies of scale tend to suggest 
that declining rural communities are not self-sustaining enough to justify 
the public expenditures that they need to function. 103  A particular 
municipality’s entire economic activity—local wages earned, property 
 
96. Cf. Sharon Strover, Reaching Rural America with Broadband Internet Service, THE 
CONVERSATION (Jan. 16, 2018, 10:08 PM), https://theconversation.com/reaching-rural-america-with-br 
oadband-internet-service-82488 [https://perma.cc/6P4D-FU79] (noting role of population sparseness 
and fewer customers from whom to recoup costs as reasons rural residents have limited access to quality 
internet service); ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 3 (noting higher costs of service 
provision in rural areas). 
97. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 33 (describing increase in minimum efficient 
scale in service provision due to technological change, as well as high fixed costs associated with 
technologies, both of which conflict with shrinking rural demand and minimal cost savings in rural 
communities); Borden, supra note 89, at 750 (describing small-scale output as a “typical barrier to entry” 
in a new market). 
98. See Tholkes & Sederberg, supra note 88; Monica Giancotti, Annamaria Guglielmo & 
Marianna Mauro, Efficiency and Optimal Size of Hospitals: Results of a Systematic Search, PLOS ONE, 
Mar. 29, 2017, at 1, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5371367/ [https://perma.cc/6JVM-
73N7]; see also ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 16, 20–21 (suggesting that services can 
be grouped into three types: private, public (e.g., police protection, firefighting services, building 
inspection, or waste disposal), and collective/joint). 
99. See Tholkes & Sederberg, supra note 88, at 10–11. 
100. See, e.g., H.R. 1109, 84th Gen. Assemb., 2d Extraordinary Sess. (Ark. 2004) (Arkansas law 
mandating school district consolidation or annexation when attendance drops below 350 students). 
101. See Borden, supra note 89, at 723–24. 
102. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, 3 (observing that the high costs of rural 
service provision need to be weighed against the interests of society as a whole). 
103. See Matthew Yglesias, The Inefficiency of Rural Living, SLATE (June 6, 2012, 10:13 AM), h 
ttps://slate.com/business/2012/06/the-inefficiency-of-rural-living.html [https://perma.cc/4DSF-8RDK] 
(pointing out the inefficiency in providing services like broadband internet, brick-and-mortar mail, and 












taxes collected, and developers attracted, for example—may still be lower 
than the local and external public inputs that would be needed to meet 
residents’ needs. Those inputs would also need to be disproportionately high 
on a per resident basis than they would for urban communities.  
This tension raises the question of whether higher rural costs per capita 
mean that rural communities’ existence cannot be justified, to the extent that 
their survival depends on disproportionately high public support and 
intervention. 104  Such diseconomies of scale are a constant concern 
underlying the question of whether and how public services should be 
provided to rural communities.105 Rural communities are seen as a relatively 
inefficient use of resources; city-dwellers may resent the idea of having to 
“subsidize” rural life. 106  Diseconomies of scale also explain private 
enterprises’ reluctance to locate in rural communities due to the more 
limited returns on their investments. 
Proposals to pursue revitalization policies for rural communities need to 
account for the ever-present question of supposed rural inefficiency when 
measured on the basis of costs per capita. In later sections, this Article 
moves the discussion beyond what are ultimately relatively narrow 
questions of costs and return on investment. A community’s worth and 
contributions to society, it is argued, cannot necessarily be summed up on 
an accounting sheet, a perspective that past regulatory policy seemed to 
embrace more readily.  
II. RURAL AMERICA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH REGULATION 
This Part provides a limited legal history of rural America and its 
relationship with economic regulation. Section II.A discusses late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal regimes that sought to protect 
rural communities and nurture their economic growth by regulating 
common carriers and public utilities. Section II.B moves to the mid- to late-
century era of deregulation and its often-fatal effects for rural communities. 
Section II.C argues that the phenomena highlighted in II.B are an 
underappreciated part of the story of rural decline, and that the infrastructure 
industries’ abandonment of rural communities during the deregulatory era 
should be recognized as a series of market failures that warrant correction. 
 
104. See Schleicher, supra note 7, at 143–45. 
105. See Bassett, supra note 19, at 283 n.26. 
106. Cf. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 4, at 31 (noting reduced willingness of 
national governments to subsidize rural service provision); Scott Wallsten, Rural Broadband Subsidy 
Programs Are a Failure. We Need to Fix Them., THE HILL (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://thehill.com/b 
logs/pundits-blog/technology/323200-rural-broadband-subsidy-programs-are-a-failure-we-need-to-fix 
[https://perma.cc/KJ5G-LUGF] (arguing that rural broadband subsidy programs have been wasteful and 
unfairly financed by all taxpayers, including low-income urban residents). 











A. The Old Regime, 1870s-1970s: Ensuring Rural Access to Services 
In the century prior to about 1970, federal economic regulatory policy 
embraced the idea that rural communities needed unique forms of protection 
if they were going to be able to survive. Indeed, there was more recognition 
generally that public intervention is a necessary precursor to private 
growth.107 The 1887 Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which introduced new 
regulations overseeing the railroad industry, reflected Congress’s first 
significant intervention to control a major economic sector.108 The ICA laid 
the groundwork for the next several decades of economic regulation of 
infrastructure industries by introducing the mandate for service providers 
not to discriminate among localities, to charge “reasonable and just rates,” 
and to publish tariffs in the interest of transparency.109  
The ICA’s provisions “appl[ied] to any common carrier or carriers 
engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, 
or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a 
common control, management, or arrangement,” in interstate or 
international travel.110 A common carrier was understood to be engaged in 
transportation of products or passengers for the benefit of the public, as 
opposed to those who typically engaged in ad hoc contractual 
arrangements. 111  The ICA also created the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) in order to implement and oversee the new regulatory 
regime.112 
In the 1886 debates over the ICA, legislators consistently returned to the 
vulnerability of small and remote towns, as well as the “interior” of the 
country, to high rates and exploitation by unscrupulous railroad operators 
seeking to maximize their profits.113 Common concerns included the risks 
 
107. See Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 447–49. 
108. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379. The Supreme Court laid 
the foundation for Congress to pursue such a move a decade earlier with its decision in Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U.S. 113 (1876), which established that state governments could regulate private businesses that 
affect public interests. 
109. Interstate Commerce Act §§ 1, 2, 6. 
110. § 1. 
111. Munn, 94 U.S. at 121–32 (“[C]ommon carriers . . . are held to ‘exercise a sort of public 
office,’ and have public duties to perform. . . . [They stand] in the very ‘gateway of commerce,’ and take 
toll from all who pass.”); Note, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers, 
71 YALE L.J. 307, 307 (1961) (“A common carrier may be defined as one who holds himself out as 
willing to carry any or specified commodities for all who may choose to employ him; upon making this 
offer he becomes legally obligated to serve all shippers at reasonable rates and without discrimination. 
A contract carrier, on the other hand, is one who does not hold himself out to serve the public; he incurs 
no special legal obligations.”). 
112. Interstate Commerce Act § 11. 
113. Congress’s attention was brought to this topic by “a pre-Populist agrarian political 













of the countryside depopulating, businesses having to close, and allowing 
or facilitating the concentrated growth of a few commercial centers if the 
railroads’ ability to discriminate among localities remained unchecked.114 
For instance, Senator Camden of West Virginia commented that 
manufacturers and shippers in parts of the country with disadvantaged 
access to transportation “may be either forced into bankruptcy or compelled 
to remove their business to the cities or competitive railroad centers.”115 He 
observed that this would have “the effect of driving population and business 
enterprise from the country and the towns to the cities and centers of railroad 
competition, and of creating for one section over another section 
commercial advantages which no power ought to be permitted to 
exercise.”116 
Senator Miller of New York expressed a similar concern about 
commercial disadvantages to remote places and problems associated with 
compelling residents and businesses to move to cities. He proposed that 
“diversified industries should be spread all over the country and not brought 
together in a few great centers.”117 Miller argued that inequitable rail rates, 
by coercing relocation to urban centers for access to cheap transportation, 
were “making a few great centers rich—rich not out of newly created 
wealth, but rich simply because you transfer wealth from other portions of 
our country to those great centers.”118 Miller referred to “[t]he abnormal 
 
monopoly railroads for grain movements to eastern markets.” Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, 
at 448. 
114. See 17 CONG. REC. 3,872 (1886) (Senator Sherman of Ohio argued, “One of the great evils 
of our times in commercial transactions is the vast concentration of capital and labor in great commercial 
centers. What has built up Chicago? It is simply because Chicago has enormous advantages over every 
interior town.”); 17 CONG. REC. 4,186–87 (1886) (Senator Camden, criticizing draft language limiting 
the non-discrimination principle, said, “In my judgment there can be no reason given for it except the 
reason to legislate in favor of the cities and the large competitive shipping points, to build them up and 
to depopulate the towns and the distribution of manufactories throughout the country. . . . I want to see 
cities grow, but they ought not to grow at the expense of the country at large.”); 18 CONG. REC. 857 
(1887) (Congressman Henderson argued, “Their coming builds up towns and enriches communities; so, 
too, their unjust management has often destroyed cities and towns and torn down hard-earned fortunes. 
Railroad owners must learn the new lesson that is coming to us all in this country, and that is to be 
content with a reasonable profit on investments, and that labor, small capital, and small shippers have 
their rights just as well as stock-owners and powerful shippers.”); 17 CONG. REC. 7,281 (1886) 
(Congressman Reagan argued that allowing service providers to discriminate “enables the transportation 
companies to control the manufacturing interests of the country and to drive them from non-competitive 
points and from the rural parts of the country, where living is cheaper and health better, to the great 
commercial centers . . . This is a power which no government of a free people would dare to exercise, 
and which no wisely administered government would think of exercising, and yet the railroad companies 
demand and insist on the right to exercise this vast and dangerous power. And under it they are 
impoverishing some cities, towns, and communities, without any fault of theirs, and enriching others 
having no other merit to this favor than the arbitrary power of the transportation companies.”). 
115. 17 CONG. REC. 3,553 (1886). 
116. Id. 
117. 17 CONG. REC. 3,727 (1886). 
118. Id. 











growth of our great cities,” attributing it “almost entirely to the 
discriminations of railroad companies.” 119  He argued that, but for this 
discrimination, “instead of a few great and overgrown centers where wealth 
is accumulated enormously . . . there would now be scattered all over this 
broad country in every little village and hamlet the great industries which 
collect around a few great competing points.”120 
Legislators were not merely concerned with fairness to small and remote 
places and their residents, but also with the public benefits of having 
widespread, equitable access to affordable transportation, at least for 
shipping purposes.121 Senator Cullom of Illinois remarked upon the benefits 
to consumers, arguing, “[e]very portion of this country . . . is alike interested 
in having the products of different sections of the country moved long 
distances at cheap rates, which benefit the people who require these 
products as well as the people who raise them.”122 He emphasized further 
that it was in “the interest of the whole country” that domestic products find 
a market somewhere, making this “not simply a question of whether Tom 
Jones can get his corn to market in Springfield,” but rather, “what the 
general policy shall be in order to encourage commerce all over this 
land.”123 
Like today, the prospect of protecting remote and sparsely populated 
places had detractors. For instance, New York Senator Platt criticized the 
possibility of all localities along railroad branches receiving comparable 
rates regardless of distance traveled. Raising concerns mirroring the 
efficiency considerations outlined above, he questioned the wisdom of 
charging the same rates for near and remote places “without reference to the 
cost of construction or the amount of business which is to be upon those 
branches” for branches that ran “through a sparsely populated country . . . 
and where there is very little business and over a road which it has cost no 
 
119. Id. 
120. Id. In a perhaps less sympathetic line of reasoning, some legislators reflected the view that 
urban communities generally were sites of moral decay and that rural communities should be sustained 
because the residents were more moral or industrious. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 4,404 (1886) (Senator 
Sherman arguing that railroad discrimination “destroys the smaller towns or communities, where vice 
does not prevail so largely as in great cities . . . where public opinion to a certain extent controls vice 
and controls all the habits of mankind. Corruption breeds in cities.”); 17 CONG. REC. 3,877 (1886) 
(“There are a great many people in the cities. They sow not, neither do they spin.”).  
121. Indeed, the entire reason railroads were able to expand involved “the economic incentives of 
generous federal and state land grants, loans, bonds, purchases of stock, and remission of taxes” based 
on the recognition “that the economic development of the interior of the North American continent 
required that a transportation infrastructure be built.” Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 448. 
122. 17 CONG. REC. 3,867 (1886). 
123. Id. at 3,867–68; see also id. at 3,876 (Senator Miller arguing that “[i]f the West can not find 
a market for its vast surplus, then New England, New York, and Pennsylvania will have no market for 












less to build.”124 Much commentary seemed to agree that an overly strict 
rule could cause harm, and exceptions were built into the legislation based 
upon potential hardships to railroad operators.125 The bill passed the Senate 
with 47 votes in favor, four votes against, and 25 absences on May 12, 1886, 
and it passed the House with 219 votes in favor, 41 votes against, and 58 
absences on January 21, 1887.126 
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the post-ICA railroad system 
was perfect; the evolution of the industry was always plagued by 
controversy, exploitative practices, and financial complexities.127 The ICC 
was also not necessarily the most potent administrator, at least initially.128 
Nonetheless, the ICA’s intervention was largely effective in enabling small, 
remote, and rural places to access rail lines. In 1917, the national core rail 
network for freight and passenger service had 254,000 miles, compared to 
140,000 today.129 A passenger during that era could travel from Maine to 
Florida without changing trains.130  By 1929, “[a]lmost every town and 
village in the nation enjoyed rail passenger service.”131  
Rural access to the rail lines in turn yielded the positive, or at least 
insulating, effects for economic development in remote communities that 
the ICA’s drafters anticipated. In the early twentieth century, “thanks to the 
railroads, corporations now saw the whole country as a unified market, 
encouraging businesses to expand beyond the borders of a particular state 
or region. America was now a national economy, rather than a series of 
 
124. 17 CONG. REC. 3,834 (1886). 
125. See, e.g., 17 CONG. REC. 3,870 (1886) (Senator Gorman of Maryland stating, “every railroad 
expert, I think, who appeared before the committee . . . admit [sic] that a rule which prohibits a railroad 
company from charging more for hauling a car-load 300 miles than is charged for hauling a car-load 
1,000 miles over the same road and in the same direction is just and proper; but they all contend that 
there are innumerable instances constantly occurring where exceptions must be made, or great injustice 
would result. Therefore, the rule should not be a rigid one[.]”). 
126. 17 CONG. REC. 4,423 (1886); 18 CONG. REC. 881 (1887). 
127. See CHRISTIAN WOLMAR, THE GREAT RAILROAD REVOLUTION: THE HISTORY OF TRAINS IN 
AMERICA 325–26 (2012) (discussing Southern courts’ role in convicting large groups of freed Black 
people through the early 1900s so that their cheap prison labor could be used for railroad construction); 
id. at 207 (discussing widespread rail company bankruptcies during 1890s due to economic downturn); 
ORSI, supra note 45, at 298 (discussing controversy over rate regulation in early 1900s). 
128. See WOLMAR, supra note 127, at 308–19 (describing railway displacement of Native 
Americans, corruption among rail executives, and rampant railway company consolidation despite the 
advent of the ICC, as well as the ICC’s ineffectuality until 1906). 
129. See id. at 308–09; AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 71 
(2017). 
130. WOLMAR, supra note 127, at 308–09. 
131. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 450; see also Jonathan English, Why Did America 
Give Up on Mass Transit? (Don’t Blame Cars.), BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (Aug. 31, 2018, 10:38 AM), ht 
tps://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-08-31/why-is-american-mass-transit-so-bad-it-s-a-long 
-story [https://perma.cc/AEH2-XB7U] (observing at the turn of the last century, “[h]uge networks of 
‘interurbans’—a kind of streetcar that ran deep into rural areas—spread out from cities across the 
country”). 











regional ones[.]”132 As an example, historian Richard Orsi argues that the 
Southern Pacific Railroad played an integral, even intentional role, in 
Western “regional economic development, small-farm settlement, 
agricultural change, and environmental policy.” 133  These relationships 
make sense, ultimately; a functioning, affordable transportation sector is a 
necessary precursor to economic growth, just as the absence of 
transportation will necessarily stifle commerce.134  
Congress amended the ICA with the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (MCA) 
to bring trucks and buses under the ICC’s purview alongside railroads, in 
significant part due to the railroads’ insistence that it was unfair for them to 
be the sole transportation industry impeded by strict regulation.135 Similar 
strains in public sentiment also drove the MCA’s passage: competition 
among truckers during the Great Depression had reached extreme levels, 
and “[s]ome feared that continuation of such unrestrained market forces 
might lead to a loss of service or higher prices for small shippers and 
communities, leaving the surviving carriers to concentrate on high-revenue 
traffic.”136 
Rural priorities seemed more mixed during debates over the MCA as 
compared to the ICA.137 During the 1934 debates over the bill in the House 
of Representatives, one congressman submitted telegrams from constituents 
pointing out that rural communities who still lacked rail access depended 
disproportionately on the trucking industry. Federal regulation of trucks, 
they argued, would increase the costs associated with trucking and have an 
adverse impact on small and independent carriers.138 A representative of the 
 
132. WOLMAR, supra note 127, at 309–10. 
133. ORSI, supra note 45, at xvii. 
134. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 463 (“Trade routes are the arteries of the 
economic system, linking every city, town, and hamlet to the life blood of commerce. ‘Transportation 
and economic development are mutually interdependent—transportation improvements stimulate 
economic growth, and that growth, in turn, increases the demand for transportation.’ The converse is 
also true.” (quoting Abdussalam A. Addus, Subsidizing Air Service to Small Communities, 39 TRANSP. 
Q. 537, 552 (1985))); see also Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 237–38 (“As the gateways to 
an increasingly global market, transportation corridors are the arteries through which everyone, and 
everything everyone consumes, flow. . . . As a fundamental component of the infrastructure upon which 
economic growth is built . . . a healthy transportation system serving the public’s needs for ubiquitous 
service at reasonable prices is vitally important to the region and the nation it serves. . . . [A] community 
with poor, declining or deteriorating access to the established and prevailing transportation networks 
will wither like a human limb or organ starved of oxygen by an artery made impassable by a tenacious 
blood clot.”). 
135. Note, National Transportation Policy and the Regulation of Motor Carriers, supra note 111, 
at 308–09. 
136. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The 
Genesis and Evolution of This Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 344 (1983). 
137. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543.  
138. Representative Paul H. Maloney introduced telegrams opposing the bill, arguing in identical 













Eastern Apple Growers’ Council testified before the House of 
Representatives: 
[W]ith the passage of this bill and the ultimate carrying out of all of 
the provisions . . . you are going to eliminate the small independent 
truck owner and turn the truck transportation over to large 
transportation companies . . .  
You take, for instance, now we have common carrier lines running 
out of the smaller cities in Virginia and all over the country, 
supplying storekeepers and merchants throughout the country that 
have no railroad facilities. Those trucks run regularly, on regular 
routes, and haul the goods out and the produce out under intrastate 
regulations.  
Now, if you put them under Federal regulation it will finally raise 
the cost of transportation. . . . You are going to affect the price level 
of the purchases and the sales of every farmer in every rural 
community in the entire United States.  
. . . . 
. . . I am a champion of the small and independent carrier, because 
he is the salvation of the rural section, so far as transportation costs 
are concerned. If we can keep him independent and unregulated, our 
transportation costs will be kept down.139  
On the other hand, a representative of the Oneonta Chamber of 
Commerce and other Upstate New York organizations argued in favor of 
increased regulation. His region’s economic activity largely depended on 
rail, and he argued that “communities where railroads and railroad 
employees are important factors . . . are all interested in overcoming the 
handicaps put on railroad transportation by unregulated carriers by water 
and motor trucks.” 140  He insisted that this was a “vital” question for 
“agricultural sections of the country.” 141  Similarly, a representative for 
southern grain shippers argued that “our business is in jeopardy on account 
of unregulated” transportation, and that the ICA was a success “because we 
do not have to worry about giving a big dinner party, or having a poker 
 
increased, which will affect adversely rural communities which are dependent on trucking facilities.” 
Regulation of Interstate Motor Busses and Trucks on Public Highways: Hearing on H.R. 6836 Before 
the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 73d Cong. 453 (1934). 
139. Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers: Hearing on H.R. 5262 and H.R. 6016 Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Com., 74th Cong. 299 (1935) (statement of W.S. 
Campfield). 
140. The Water Carrier Act, 1935: Hearing on H.R. 5379 Before H. Comm. on Merch. Marine & 
Fisheries, 74th Cong. 156–57 (1935) (statement of William Capron). 
141. Id. at 158. 











party, or something of that sort, in order to get a rate” in rail 
transportation.142 
The MCA ultimately seemed to attempt to reconcile competing rural 
interests. It provided that common carriers by motor vehicle needed to 
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC in 
order to operate, and that such providers could not engage in unjust 
discrimination among localities.143  But it automatically grandfathered in 
carriers operating before June 1, 1935.144 The Act also excluded “motor 
vehicles controlled and operated by any farmer, and used in the 
transportation of his agricultural commodities and products thereof, or in 
the transportation of supplies to his farm” and “motor vehicles used 
exclusively in carrying livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural 
commodities[.]”145 
According to Paul Stephen Dempsey, the MCA, like the ICA, succeeded 
in providing equitable rural access to these transportation services. After the 
MCA’s passage: 
Destructive competition abated, and during the half century which 
followed, motor carrier service was ubiquitously available 
throughout the nation at a price which was “just and reasonable.” 
Service was safe and dependable to large and small communities 
throughout the nation. . . . [T]here was some measure of “cross 
subsidization” performed under the regulatory umbrella of the ICC . 
. . with more lucrative, denser traffic lanes paying a premium above 
marginal costs to subsidize rural and small community service.146 
Congress continued its pattern of intervention with the Civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938 (CAA). 147  In advocating the legislation’s passage, aviator 
Colonel Edgar Gorrell, one of the law’s most ardent advocates, argued in 
testimony before Congress that smaller airlines required protection against 
stronger, larger lines.148 He contended that by “reaching out into the regions 
of light-density traffic and developing smaller communities, the small lines 
 
142. To Amend the Interstate Commerce Act: Hearing on S. 1629, S. 1632, and S. 1635 Before 
the S. Comm. on Interstate Com. and the Merch. Marine Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Com., 74th Cong. 
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146. Dempsey, supra note 76, at 187. 
147. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 
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148. Aviation: Hearing on H.R.5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign 
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have performed an incalculable service to the country.” 149  To keep 
providing that service, they needed assurance through “an opportunity to 
protect themselves against even the possibility of oppressive 
competition.”150 The CAA was passed, and “entry regulation was imposed 
upon the infant airline industry, in part, so that small communities would 
have access to this emerging mode of transport.”151  
Congress once again continued on the path of intervention with the 
Transportation Act of 1940.152 This was the first federal effort to craft a 
comprehensive national transportation policy, 153  and the first time “a 
national transportation policy governing all agencies subject to the Interstate 
Commerce act [sic] ha[d] been enacted.”154 Its “chief feature” was “further 
extension of unified and centralized control of domestic transportation,” 
including adding water carriers to the ICC’s purview, setting additional 
rates and permit requirements, and establishing a Board of Investigation and 
Research to study each mode of transportation.155 Overall, transportation 
policies culminating with the 1940 act “reflect[ed] a strong congressional 
policy that the public in rural areas be protected against pricing and service 
discrimination.”156 
As with transportation, regulatory policy of the era embraced the idea 
that geographically equitable access to telecommunications services was 
necessary. After the advent of the telephone in 1876, Alexander Graham 
Bell’s use of his patented technology helped him establish the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) in 1895, which initially had a 
monopoly.157  With the expiration of the patents just after 1900, AT&T 
encountered competition from independent companies.158 Theodore Vail, 
then-president of AT&T, “pressed for universal service and government 
regulation to curb what he saw as wasteful competition.”159 AT&T was then 
brought under the jurisdiction of the ICC with the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, 
which amended the ICA.160 The Act applied “to telegraph, telephone, and 
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cable companies (whether wired or wireless) engaged in sending messages 
from one State, Territory, or District of the United States, to any other . . . 
who shall be considered and held to be common carriers.”161 It excluded 
from the Act “the transmission of messages by telephone, telegraph, or 
cable wholly within one State.”162 It provided that all charges made for “the 
transmission of messages by telegraph, telephone, or cable . . . shall be just 
and reasonable”163 and that rates and charges for telegraph and telephone 
transmissions could not be “unjust or unreasonable or unjustly 
discriminatory.”164 
The Radio Acts of 1912 and 1927 also held major implications for rural 
access to telecommunications. The former placed radio communications 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC.165 The latter created the Federal Radio 
Commission and established the standard that radio stations, in order to 
receive a license, needed to show that the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity would be served by the granting” of the license.166 In advocating 
passage of the Radio Act of 1927, Congressman Johnson of Texas 
commented that his rural constituents had requested that Congress intervene 
with anti-monopoly, anti-discrimination measures:  
The people of Texas are interested in legislation on this subject. . 
. . I want to quote from [a letter] which I received . . . from a farmer 
who lives in an inland rural community in my home country. . . . 
[T]he writer says:  
[“]Please use your influence in keeping corporations from getting 
control of the air by a series of chain stations, high-power stations, 
purchase of wave lengths, or any other monopoly that would create 
further disturbances which will interfere with our listening in on other 
closer-in stations. The combination of the eight large stations in the 
northeast[] . . . are very annoying to people in Texas.[”]167 
Congress subsequently enacted the Communications Act of 1934 and 
modeled it after the ICA.168 As with the Transportation Act of the same 
period, rural interests were mixed, with some advocating protections and 
universal service and others arguing that small, independent rural service 
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providers and their constituents would be better off left alone.169 Many rural 
communities were served by small, independent phone companies with just 
a few dozen to a few hundred customers.170 Their representatives insisted 
that complying with additional federal regulations would impose costs on 
companies that were already struggling to survive and serve their 
constituents.171 On the other hand, some remained concerned about rural 
access to quality radio communications, particularly since rural 
communities were disproportionately dependent on radio. 172  Texas 
Congressman Thomas Blanton, in advocating for protecting rural access to 
radio communications, argued, “every congressional district of the United 
States is entitled to a small local station, and I want to see every 
Congressman here have at least a small local station in his home town. The 
people are entitled to this.”173  
The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and tasked it with ensuring “so far as possible, to all the 
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide 
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges.”174 Like the MCA, it seemed to try to reconcile competing rural 
interests. The Act specifically excluded from its purview any intrastate 
communications or any wire communications already regulated by a state 
commission. 175  This would have excluded small, independent, locally 
focused telephone companies. But the Act’s mandate for universal service 
was broad, meaning that those rural communities without service would be 
able to receive it under the Act, which provided: 
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate 
or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such 
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communication service upon reasonable request therefor; and, in 
accordance with the orders of the Commission, in cases where the 
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action 
necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical 
connections with other carriers, to establish through routes and 
charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to 
establish and provide facilities and regulations for operating such 
through routes.176 
The Act required that charges for services be “just and reasonable” and 
prohibited common carriers from making “any unjust or unreasonable 
discrimination.” 177  Its goal of achieving universal service meant that 
“subscribers in rural, isolated and high-cost areas . . . should have access to 
services at comparable rates to those available in urban areas.”178 
The tensions surrounding telecommunications service provision, access, 
and pricing mirrored those surrounding transportation. 179  In the 1950s, 
telephone companies requested rate increases, but were denied by the Public 
Utility Commissions that oversaw them in part due to the public policy 
objective of universal service. 180  Instead of increasing rates, agencies 
developed a policy of subsidizing local rates by making long-distance rates 
more expensive, thereby making local rates more affordable for average 
users.181 This meant that “the generous profits earned on heavily trafficked, 
densely populated (urban) routes subsidized less profitable, thin (rural) 
markets.”182 This substantial revenue-shifting system persisted for several 
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decades. As late as 1983, “the average monthly price charged for local 
residential service was about $11, while the average monthly cost of 
providing the service was approximately $26.”183  
Although perhaps less profitable for the service providers, these 
approaches were effective. Telephone access went from forty percent of 
U.S. households in 1930 to more than ninety percent in 1970.184  Rural 
access to radio, alongside rural electrification pursued in the same era, is 
credited with modernizing the American countryside. Like transportation, 
affordable access to telecommunications is an essential part of economic 
vitality. 185  Specifically, “the availability of telecommunication services 
reduces isolation, increases business viability, improves farming 
productivity, and improves access to educational and medical services.”186 
The availability of quality telecommunications infrastructure can help rural 
communities attract other resources and thrive, while on the flip side, the 
absence of effective telecommunications may doom a region to economic 
stagnation.187  
In general, the regulatory approach for public utilities in this era sought 
to reduce competition for several reasons. Certain service providers were 
deemed to have natural monopolies, or markets where high costs of entry 
would result in “economic waste” if competition were allowed by making 
customers pay multiple times for fixed costs of infrastructure, such as 
stringing telephone wires. 188  Thus, policymakers actively advocated 
barriers to entry and unification of services in order to allow the service 
provider in question to achieve an economy of scale.189 But the question of 
rural access also revealed that competition needed to be curtailed for another 
reason: if small, independent rural service providers—like telephone 
companies, radio stations, and truck companies—were forced to compete 
with large corporate companies, the rural service providers were going to 
lose, which would likely also mean a drop in quality of service to rural 
communities. Further, if competition remained unfettered, more rural 
communities risked not being served at all.  
From the passage of the ICA through the 1940s, the regulatory 
frameworks that governed the transportation and telecommunications 
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industries served the goal of securing, enhancing, or protecting rural service 
in four main ways. First, those frameworks removed barriers to rural access 
to services by forcing companies to be responsive to rural service requests 
through principles of non-discrimination.190 Second, they protected existing 
rural services by excluding or protecting small, independent intrastate 
service providers from regulation, and by protecting existing providers from 
competition so they could achieve economies of scale.191 Third, they limited 
service providers’ ability to abandon rural service by requiring 
administrative justifications to do so and refusing requests if those 
justifications did not comport with public interest standards.192 And fourth, 
they helped make rural services affordable through measures such as 
subsidizing rural rates with profits from less-expensive regions and by 
imposing the “just and reasonable” standard for rates.193 
Altogether, these protections created a framework that had a substantial 
impact in helping rural communities overcome the handicap of the 
diseconomies of scale that naturally arise with distance and population 
sparseness. As Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks, andChristopher Serkin 
observe, this regulatory order “promoted geographic dispersion in economic 
activity . . . [and] helped construct an era of geographic convergence in the 
mid-twentieth century.” 194  While regional wealth today tends to be 
concentrated in a handful of megacities, during this regulatory period, more 
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wealth moved across geographic boundaries. This distributional geographic 
equity was in large part due to the role of the regulatory apparatus in evening 
the playing field for disadvantaged localities that would otherwise be what 
they are seen as today—“left behind.”195 
Of course, regulated industries mandated to provide non-discriminatory 
access and fair rates to rural communities did not create rural utopias. Rural 
America was already transforming in the early twentieth century. 196 
Agricultural economics were changing; populations fluctuated. 197 
Economic regulation of infrastructure industries is not the only policy 
affecting rural communities. But as the next section shows, the transition to 
deregulating certain common carriers and public utilities inflicted a deep 
wound on rural communities—one that was easy to overlook from the 
vantage of the city, and one that made it all the harder for rural communities 
to recover from other shocks they would experience in the coming decades.  
B. The New Regime, 1970s – the Present 
The national rail system was not doing well by the 1950s and 60s.198 
Increasingly disgruntled rail companies used freight profits to subsidize 
struggling passenger lines. 199  With the Transportation Act of 1958, 
Congress limited state PUCs’ jurisdiction over passenger train 
discontinuances and expanded the ICC’s powers to allow discontinuances, 
pushing train service further down a path to decline.200 By the late 1960s, 
train passengers experienced “poor service, schedules, and abrasive 
treatment” by railroads.201  Rail companies supposedly had “deliberately 
downgraded standards and discouraged patronage” because of their desire 
to discontinue service on unprofitable lines.202  
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The Supreme Court set the stage for increased rates of discontinuing 
common carrier services with its 1964 decision in Southern Railway Co. v. 
North Carolina,203 which tilted the scale in the decision-making process 
more heavily in favor of carrier profits over potential impacts of loss of 
service on local populations. Southern Railway and the ICC’s evolving 
standards paved the way for railways to discontinue common carrier 
service. While 1929 saw a peak of 20,000 passenger trains, “the number of 
passenger trains fell by 60 percent between 1958 and 1970. By 1970, only 
360 intercity trains were left.”204 
Demand grew for Congress to address the “national disgrace” of the 
railroads.205 The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 reflected Congress’s 
effort to save passenger rail service with the creation of Amtrak. 206 
However, this law would usher in a new era of transportation deregulation 
that would deeply exacerbate rural isolation. 207  Nevertheless, some 
advocates of rural interests saw themselves as having no other choice. 
Senator Frank Church of Idaho explained why he reluctantly planned to vote 
in favor of the law: 
I have no confidence that this legislation will really solve the 
problems of providing clean, comfortable, and salable railroad 
passenger service. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . The theory seems to be that the Union Pacific can improve its 
railroad passenger service by removing it altogether. Many 
passengers who have suffered the poor service, schedules, and 
abrasive treatment of the railroad may feel that way also.  
Yet there are other people in rural areas who still must rely on train 
transportation. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . I will support the legislation. I hope that . . . it will result in 
some measure of assistance to the people of my State of Idaho.208 
Perhaps most significantly, the Act created the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, which superseded the ICC as the overseer of 
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passenger rail service and continued the trend of chipping away at the ICC 
as protector of geographic equity.209 As private rail gave way to Amtrak, 
500 additional communities lost intercity passenger train service.210 As of 
the late 1980s, commentators observed that “with the exception of the 
heavily traveled Boston-Washington corridor, service levels on American 
passenger trains are the worst in the world.”211 Meanwhile, throughout these 
developments, “thousands of small communities” were “pruned from the 
system.”212 
Legislators debating the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 recognized the 
grave risks deregulation posed to rural communities in light of the blow loss 
of airline service would inflict. Some insisted that the law included adequate 
protective measures. Kansas Republican Senator James Pearson explained 
that he:  
had some reservations . . . related more to the problems of local air 
service in those rural parts of our country where rail passenger 
transportation no longer exists, where bus service is inadequate, and 
where in many instances the commuter service or local air service is 
really one of the last means of people achieving a sense of 
communication and doing their commerce and business as is 
necessary. 
. . . I think [a change made to address that concern] adequately 
fills the needs of the local air carriers in a new and abbreviated 
certified manner with a new subsidy program. 
. . . It is a phased deregulation. It is not total deregulation. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [M]y concern was for the small and isolated communities 
across the country. Communities that depend upon subsidized air 
service for economic growth and stability. But I now believe that the 
bill adequately protects such communities.213  
In a similar vein, New Mexico Republican Senator Harrison Schmitt said 
during debates that his primary concern was “what would happen to the 
small communities of our country.”214  He said he believed that “small 
communities will be treated most fairly” because they would have a 
guarantee of air service for the first time.215 He outlined the bill’s provisions 
 
209. Tobey, supra note 198, at 255. 
210. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 453. 
211. Id. (quoting William E. Thoms, Clear Track for Deregulation American Railroads, 1970–
1980, 12 TRANSP. L.J. 183, 196 (1982)) (misquotation in original). 
212. Id. 
213. 124 CONG. REC. 10,649–50 (1978). 
214. Id. at 10,652.  
215. Id. 











that would protect small communities, including direct subsidies, a 
guarantee of air service for ten years, a requirement for an airline wishing 
to abandon a small community to be replaced, and a new certification for 
local air carriers with more liberal regulations.216 
Others were less optimistic. South Dakota Democratic Senator George 
McGovern characterized airline deregulation as a “grim scenario” with 
virtually immeasurable downstream effects on municipal airport 
investments and airline industry employees with specialized skills.217 But 
“[t]he focal point” of his concern was “the air service for smaller 
communities.”218 He anticipated a mass exit of rural service providers and a 
deterioration of service where it still existed, emphasizing that policymakers 
should look to what would happen after the ten-year phaseout.219 Advocates 
for small communities also testified before Congress, “provid[ing] example 
after example of the discriminatory fares and deteriorating service resulting 
from deregulation,” trends which would fall disproportionately on small, 
remote localities across the country.220 
As McGovern predicted, the airline industry followed in step with the 
rail industry in curtailing service to rural communities. The Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 allowed “[a]ll but the last carrier in a market” to 
be free to discontinue service at will.221 Congress did establish a ten-year 
program of federal subsidies to provide air service to impacted small 
communities, although it was generally “alleged that small communities had 
little to fear from deregulation” because of some policymakers’ insistence 
that regional markets would adjust to meet needs.222 Yet, 40% of small 
communities experienced a loss of air service after deregulation. 223 
Meanwhile, ticket prices increased disproportionately for those 
communities, in addition to a rise in other convenience and safety 
concerns.224  
Common carrier exits contributed to a demonstrable downward cycle for 
these communities, and many of these trends came before the ten-year 
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federal subsidy to ensure service to small communities ran out.225 Regional 
access to commerce is in large part dependent on regional access to 
affordable transportation; the vast majority of major businesses at the time 
indicated in a survey that they would not locate in an area without access to 
air transportation.226 With a national shift away from manufacturing in the 
1980s toward the service sector, large employers began to require 
sophisticated communications and information systems, including high-
quality air service, which had come to be viewed as a comparable necessity 
to electricity and telephones—prompting some to argue that air service 
should be treated as a public utility. 227  Just as Western ghost towns 
proliferated as a result of discontinued rail service, a bankrupt airline could 
create a ghost town. While some praised these deregulatory efforts as 
laudable moves toward efficiency, other commentary at the time lamented 
the retreat of critical public protections.228 
Finally, “[w]ith the passenger trains having vanished from rural 
America, and with commercial aircraft no longer landing at many small 
town airports, the only means of public intercity transport left was the 
bus.”229 But, following in step, the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 
expanded carriers’ ability to abandon or discontinue service and raise fares. 
Local residents could attempt to forestall abandonment by proving that a 
closure would leave them without alternative means of public transport. Yet, 
the ICC consistently sided with companies, prompting the New York 
Department of Transportation to claim that the ICC showed “a total 
disregard and lack of concern for the welfare of the riding public.”230 A mere 
eleven months after deregulation, 1,294 locations in forty states lost or were 
proposed to lose service, 776 of whom lost intercity service entirely.231 Most 
 
225. Meyer, supra note 4, at 219 (“Not surprisingly, carriers began to drop service on unprofitable 
routes. Direct subsidies failed to stem the tide of rural retrenchment. The result has been the well-
documented isolation of rural communities.” (footnotes omitted)). 
226. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 458. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 459 (“[S]ome measure of public protection is more than justified. And who else but a 
public agency can serve as the ultimate arbiter, stabilizing the kind of erratic market conditions that 
brought about the creation of these agencies in the first place?” (quoting SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN 
TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 250 (1983)). 
229. Id.; see also Dempsey, Legal History, supra note 23, at 366 (discussing measures to 
deregulate the trucking industry in the 1990s). 
230. Dempsey, The Dark Side, supra note 23, at 460 (quoting Household Goods Transportation 
and Bus Regulatory Reform Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the S. 
Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 99th Cong. 145 (1985) [hereinafter Household Goods Hearing] 
(statement of John K. Mladinov)). 
231. Id. at 461 (citing Household Goods Hearing, supra note 230, at 2 (statement of Sen. Larry 
Pressler)). 











of those communities had populations of less than 10,000.232 In short, “[i]n 
less than [one] year, almost [one] million people lost their bus service.”233  
In 1991, Congress passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA), which formally devolved highway planning to the 
states. 234  In 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 
mandated statewide transportation planning, which included some of the 
first planning initiatives for rural areas.235 Yet, today, rural communities 
remain isolated from national transportation networks. Anyone who has 
sought to take a bus, train, or plane to a remote or small town has 
experienced the expense and inconvenience associated with modern rural 
transportation access.236 
As the regulation of rural telecommunications mirrored the regulation of 
rural transportation, so did deregulation, although the legal pathway was a 
bit different. In the 1940s, AT&T’s size and dominance drew the attention 
of the U.S. Department of Justice, which argued as early as a 1949 lawsuit 
that AT&T was in violation of the Sherman Act and that its lack of 
competition undermined the goals of public regulation.237 AT&T agreed in 
a 1956 consent decree that it would limit its activities to the 
telecommunications sector, license its technologies to competitors, and 
subject itself to competition from other firms.238 It jostled for power with 
competitors in judicial and agency processes for the next twenty years when 
the political tides were turning even further away from the natural monopoly 
model. 1984 then saw the largest corporate dismantling in the history of 
antitrust, when AT&T was forced to divest itself of Bell operating 
companies.239 
Like with transportation, deregulation of the telecommunications sector 
was disproportionately hard on rural communities. Specifically, Dempsey 
wrote in 1989: 
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Deregulation . . . affected rural telephone bills as telephone 
companies passed on more of the actual service cost to their 
customers. In the past, federal regulation supported rural subsidies. 
Under rate-averaging requirements, the FCC required telephone 
companies to charge urban and rural customers the same for service, 
despite the fact that fewer customers were available to cover fixed 
costs. . . . Adequate telecommunications services at a reasonable 
price are essential for economic growth. . . .  
[R]ural telephone bills have increased. The process of 
deregulation could hasten depopulation of rural areas and further the 
congestion of urban areas because of the greater availability and 
lower costs of essential services in urban areas.240 
Universal service is still a legal mandate for phone service providers 
today, both wired and cellular.241 Yet, rural communities have been left 
behind in this sector as well. Dempsey observed in his writing thirty years 
ago that rural communities were being left out of the “technology 
revolution”; that rural communities might “never be strung to the national 
fiber optics system”; and that generally, “whatever benefits urban regions 
of the nation may enjoy in terms of new technology and increased 
competition, these benefits appear not to be trickling down to the rural 
regions of the nation.”242 
Replacing the Telecommunications Act of 1934, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 brought “[t]he cornerstone of 
telecommunications deregulation in the United States.”243 Ironically, then, 
the telecommunications sector was turned loose just as the seeds were 
planted for the internet to grow into one of the most important fundamental 
services of modern society. The “public interest” standard, once 
encompassing only the needs of “subscribers,” “broadened to include 
private business and the market. Thus, the public interest morphed into a 
competitive economic environment.”244 In reducing the role for the FCC’s 
oversight, the Act broke up traditional regulated phone monopolies and 
gave state public utility commissions responsibility for ensuring universal 
service and for overseeing pricing. 
The 1996 Act mandated funding for rural schools, libraries, and 
healthcare facilities’ telecommunications technology. But it “left out low-
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income households and high cost regions, including rural areas.”245 As a 
result of relaxed regulations, some rural regions were left “with antiquated 
telephone technology” that technically meets modern federal requirements 
for universal service, but still “provides a menu of services far below those 
available in urban areas.” 246  Again perhaps ironically, the current 
framework does use the old tool of cross-subsidization to enhance rural 
access to broadband internet, but most commentators agree that this tool 
alone, particularly as it is implemented, does not do nearly enough to ensure 
universal, equitable service to this critical amenity that serves as the 
gateway for access to many important downstream uses.247 
C. Rural Abandonment as a Series of Market Failures 
Many of today’s challenging rural conditions can be traced back to 
deregulation. Rural communities other than those considered amenity-rich 
have experienced deterioration as populations have migrated to cities, 
regional employers have shuttered, local governments have lost tax revenue 
critical to providing basic services, and infrastructure has aged. This 
downward cycle of economic non-development is precisely what 
policymakers and rural advocates have feared since the debates over the 
ICA: when necessary infrastructure services are not required to provide 
service to less profitable places, they do not. The move toward service 
providers’ discretionary service provision has contributed to the 
concentration of services in smaller geographic areas, regional economic 
turmoil, the depopulation of the countryside, and exacerbated geographic 
wealth inequality. 
Commentary on rural communities today has some consistent themes. 
Rural communities have been “abandoned,” “left behind,” made “strangers 
in their own land.” 248  White rural residents are portrayed as resentful, 
enraged, and alienated. In searching for the causes of this alienation, 
commentary often points to two factors. The first is the disproportionate 
economic growth that has benefited cities, associated with the loss of 
traditional livelihoods that have contributed to rural obsolescence.249 The 
second is increasing demographic diversity and cultural progressivism, 
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much of which is seen in cities, making disproportionately older, white rural 
residents feel culturally estranged and angry.250 
As to the first factor, ample commentary points to globalization and 
automation as drivers of rural obsolescence, a narrative which prior work 
has challenged. 251  Critically, deregulation remains an under-examined 
player lurking in the background of both the economic and cultural 
marginalization factors. Deregulating the transportation and 
telecommunications industries literally isolated rural communities, cutting 
them off from the rest of the country and exacerbating regional financial 
burdens. 252  This not only excluded them from national and regional 
economic activity, but also excised them from the broader cultural 
ecosystem. What was to be expected after rural communities were cut off 
from trains, planes, buses, and their access to communications systems 
made more expensive, other than economic stagnation and cultural 
estrangement? 
Yet, the need to cultivate rural America remains. As Laurie Ristino has 
observed in Surviving Climate Change in America: Toward a Rural 
Resilience Framework, “[r]ural America has a key role to play in our 
national resilience because it is the locus of our nation’s ecosystem services, 
including food and fiber provisioning.” 253  Others have observed that 
transitions to renewable energy will require drawing more upon rural land 
and workers in light of the substantial footprint such installations often 
require. 254  In addition to the provision of food, energy, and fibers, as 
mentioned in this Article’s introduction, rural communities have important 
potential as better-supported stewards of eighty percent of the country’s 
land mass, such as in the management of forestland to prevent or mitigate 
devastating wildfires. 255  Other important roles for rural communities 
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include maintaining outdoor recreation opportunities, safeguarding 
priceless heritage sites, and helping conserve or manage wildlife.256 
In light of deregulation’s role in undercutting the important services rural 
America is uniquely positioned to provide—and few would suggest that our 
current food and energy systems are acceptable as is—infrastructure 
industries’ abandonment of rural communities should be viewed as a series 
of market failures. Despite developments attempting to maintain rural 
service provision even after deregulation, rural communities today are 
relatively isolated both from national transportation networks and national 
telecommunications networks. Where they are connected, the services they 
receive may be less robust or more expensive.257 
This isolation and its associated harms to rural communities’ 
contributions to society could be categorized under two different versions 
of “market failure.” Generally, “[e]conomists use the term market failure to 
describe less than optimally functioning markets.” 258  Markets are only 
allowed to operate based on the understanding that markets “enhance 
overall well-being” by moving toward optimal allocations of resources.259 
The failure of markets to furnish rural communities with adequate 
infrastructure services could be considered as either or both of two different 
types of market failure. First, consumers may fall victim to market failures 
in a variety of conditions, including a “lack of choice due to a paucity of 
alternative sellers.”260 That is, if consumers demand a good or service but 
that good or service is in low supply, a market failure is present.261 Rural 
communities certainly exemplify this today; if one simply attempts to 
purchase a plane ticket for a remote locality or nearby, the likely high price 
of the ticket illustrates how rural communities bear this burden. 
A second version of market failure is the phenomenon known as the 
tragedy of the commons, or a failure to protect public goods.262 The tragedy 
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of the commons arises when markets fail to protect or sustain goods or 
services that are important to everyone.263 In light of rural communities’ 
ongoing importance to the nation—and their close relationship with the 
classic example of the common good, the natural environment—markets’ 
failures to sustain rural communities in and of themselves should be 
considered a tragedy of the commons. In other words, rural socioeconomic 
decline in and of itself reflects a tragedy of the commons—the classic 
market failure.  
This argument does raise a fundamental question about rural 
revitalization: what about those communities that may never have served 
some form of national interest, or do not seem like they are well-positioned 
to? Should the approaches discussed in the next section still apply to them, 
or do we draw the line at some point in terms of a particular community’s 
worthiness? For instance, former coal mining communities in Central 
Appalachia once contributed to the national energy grid; perhaps 
infrastructure markets’ abandonment of them was a market failure during 
that era, but it is not necessarily clear now that this particular region 
warrants intervention, at least based on this rationale.264 
This question implicates several important issues. First, greater 
recognition of the deep problems with the ways food and energy are 
produced could inform a substantially different vision of a possible rural 
future.265 Both sectors require substantial restructuring. If food production 
is to be sustainable from an environmental and public health standpoint, it 
cannot continue to rely so fundamentally on monoculture cash crops, 
concentrated animal feeding operations, and other forms of hazardous 
industrialized agriculture. 266  Similarly, the need for low-carbon energy 
production is urgent, and will require a substantial land use footprint.267 
Enhanced wildlife and ecosystem conservation is also a pressing national 
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need.268 Rural communities, by their nature being population-sparse and 
proximal to more land, will need to be a central part of these solutions.  
Thus, for any given community, the question should not be, “do they 
contribute to national interests?,” but rather, “could they contribute to 
national interests?”269 Again, this raises the point made earlier that these 
proposals are not seeking to recreate the rural America of the past, but to 
envision its role for the future. This question would in turn raise questions 
about how rural community economic development should be pursued more 
generally. Although prior work has argued that a vision for any given 
region’s economic future must involve input from residents affected,270 
there is of course an important role for state and federal actors to 
contemplate and incentivize rural activities that contribute to national 
welfare.  
Mobility, political stability, sovereignty, and ethical concerns are four 
additional considerations that factor into the question of intervention, 
regardless of a given region’s contributions to national interests. Perhaps an 
existing community has nothing to offer—it would be difficult for a 
policymaker or other decisionmaker to conclude as much, but maybe it 
could be true.  
In that case, asking four additional questions could help inform a path 
forward. First, are there barriers to mobility that keep the residents of this 
place from relocating to another region with a higher quality of life?271 
Second, does non-intervention nevertheless pose a threat to political 
stability that comes with destabilized socioeconomic welfare, as was 
arguably illustrated with high rates of rural support for President Trump?272 
Third, in the context of Native American reservations, which are mostly 
rural, is the given community imbued with sovereignty as an independent 
nation such that coercing relocation by neglect would be tantamount to 
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destroying a country?273 And, fourth, could some other deep attachment to 
place also warrant against letting the community die, even if it does not 
benefit collective welfare?274 One would be hard-pressed to find a locality 
where at least one of the answers to these questions is not in the affirmative. 
But to the extent a particular locality could be deemed beyond help, the 
struggles of the residents there would still implicate broader questions of 
non-place-specific problems with deep socioeconomic inequality. 
In short, while this discussion does insist upon the import of ongoing 
rural contributions to society, it is not necessarily the case that rural 
communities should be mandated to earn their keep, so to speak, in order to 
merit access to infrastructure and other basic necessities. The next section 
examines what type of steps could be taken to counteract the trends of rural 
infrastructure abandonment, both through the lens of concern for the rural 
consumer and because of concern for common goods and services 
associated with rural livelihoods.  
III. CORRECTING RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE MARKETS IN THE MODERN 
ERA 
One would be hard-pressed to argue that that the regulatory apparatus of 
the past—relying fundamentally on mechanisms such as universal service 
mandates, cross-subsidization, tariffs, and service bundling—can simply be 
revived as a part of a reform effort to help overcome the barrier of rural 
diseconomies of scale.275 Cross-subsidizing telephone rates, for example, 
may have worked a century ago, but would be less feasible in today’s 
political climate. 276  The approach has been used in the context of 
broadband, but is largely viewed as not going far enough to achieve the aim 
of universal service.277 This suggests that creative, novel thinking about 
market interventions in the modern context are warranted. This Part argues 
that if we are truly to understand and meet the needs of rural communities—
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which we should do not just for their sake, but for everyone’s—our 
understanding of infrastructure will need to be broadened, which will also 
require a recalibration of the balance between public and private interests. 
A new scholarly movement has sought to revitalize the idea of the public 
utility and to examine what a modernized version of infrastructural 
regulation could and should look like.278 K. Sabeel Rahman has developed 
a framework for conceptualizing “the new utilities”—that is, contemplating 
where the balance between public and private interests should stand today 
and what today’s version of interventions into markets, particularly for 
those markets affecting services thought of as “infrastructure,” ought to 
be.279 Rahman argues that the 1870s–1970s regulatory toolkit can actually 
be seen as broader than it is often characterized. It involved “a range of 
interventions aimed at addressing the problem of power over 
infrastructure,” but did not necessarily insist on any particular approach.280 
Thus, even initially, the concept of regulatory interventions “was essentially 
fluid” and could change alongside changes in technological and economic 
conditions.281 Rahman therefore argues that the old vision of regulation does 
not need to be resurrected by way of rote mimicry in the post-deregulatory 
era. Rather, there is a need to build upon the original approaches and 
contemplate “a more modern and flexible way of adapting public utility 
traditions to contemporary infrastructure.”282 
Rahman’s framework has unique applicability to the rural question 
because it offers guidance as to when and how policymakers should seek to 
overcome the natural rural handicap of diseconomies of scale by intervening 
into markets.283 This Part draws upon Rahman’s framework to articulate 
possible pathways that could be used to help redirect markets to rural 
communities and when such intervention is warranted. 284  In laying the 
foundation for his proposed framework for regulating infrastructure, 
Rahman explains that “a variety of tools” including “oversight, structuralist 
regulations, and public options” should be considered in the arsenal of 
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approaches for regulating infrastructure today.285 These tools should then be 
applied to sectors with certain infrastructure-like characteristics.  
Rahman’s framework includes three analytical steps to determine the 
optimal approach to a given question about whether and how to regulate a 
sector as “infrastructure.” The first step is to diagnose what counts as 
“infrastructure.” He defines infrastructural goods and services as having 
three defining characteristics. The first is that “infrastructure arises where 
there might be some form of economies of scale in production.”286 The 
second factor “is the degree to which the good or service unlocks a wide 
range of downstream uses.”287 And the third is “the risk of vulnerability to 
private power or domination.”288 
Once a good or service is categorized as infrastructure, the second step 
is to draw from “a flexible range of tools” in order to assure fair and equal 
access to that good or service.289 These tools do include the regulatory 
oversight typically associated with the old regulatory regime. Describing 
this approach as among the “central legacies” of utilities regulation, 
Rahman characterizes it as imposing “affirmative obligations to provide 
services to marginalized or overlooked constituencies, or to comply with 
legal standards of nondiscrimination.” 290  But other tools should be 
considered as well. Rahman proposes “structuralist regulation” as one 
option, meaning “attempts to transform the corporate structures of the firms 
themselves providing these infrastructural goods as a way to preempt 
exploitative or exclusionary treatment by reducing potential conflicts of 
interest.”291 A third main tool Rahman highlights is the possibility of public 
options, in which “public actors themselves directly provide the good or 
service in question.”292 
The third and final step is to “develop a governance regime that assures 
that such utility-style regulation is itself administered in an accountable and 
public-interested manner.” 293  Rahman proposes that policymakers today 
should design regulatory bodies and public utility agencies “in ways that 
institutionalize more systematic—and flexible—internal checks and 
balances.”294 In other words, a modern reconceptualization of infrastructure 
governance should seek to overcome the issues of the old regime that 
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undermined its accountability and legitimacy with constituents and 
detractors. 
Rahman’s framework reveals a few important points for considering the 
rural relationship to infrastructure. The first is that a good or service that 
might not be considered “infrastructure” in an urban setting might count as 
infrastructure in a rural one. Take, for example, a remote town’s last grocery 
store, perhaps a Walmart or a Dollar Store. In an urban setting, such a store 
would be unlikely to meet the conditions under Rahman’s first step 
characterizing infrastructure. The Walmart’s “scale” would be of little 
significance. Although food deserts certainly exist in urban settings, local 
consumers would have alternative options within some municipal 
geographic range for buying their necessities if the Walmart left. This means 
the Walmart’s departure would have finite effects on downstream uses, 
although it could of course create substantial problems for people. And 
because of local residents’ alternative options, even if inconvenient, their 
vulnerability to the abuse of private power by the Walmart would also be 
finite. 
But in a rural setting, it is possible that a single remaining Walmart in a 
town otherwise devoid of grocery stores should in fact be considered 
infrastructure. The scale of the Walmart does matter in a rural context: are 
there enough local residents and consumers to justify the expenses 
associated with operating the Walmart? In a sense, the Walmart does need 
to be “at scale” or it will consider leaving. Second, in a rural setting, the 
Walmart unlocks downstream uses just as much as a more traditional form 
of infrastructure such as clean water or electricity; if there is no reasonably 
close alternative way to procure food, people will be unable to live in the 
rural locality at all. Finally, the risk of vulnerability to private domination 
in this context is heightened due to the imbalance of power between the 
Walmart and the residents. The Walmart can leave and incur relatively 
minimal losses in the spectrum of considerations for the Walmart 
corporation. The rural town losing its Walmart, by contrast, stands to 
unravel completely with the Walmart’s closure, as was the case when this 
happened in the former coal-mining community of McDowell County, West 
Virginia, in 2016.295 
As this example illustrates, policymakers seeking to address the problem 
of rural infrastructure and diseconomies of scale may need to expand their 
understanding of what constitutes infrastructure. That is, infrastructure does 
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not necessarily need to involve multimillion-dollar projects that will take 
years to complete. State or federal legislatures could intervene in this 
particular infrastructural sector by making it harder for a resource like a 
Walmart to abandon its constituents, so to speak. This idea is not as novel 
and radical as it may sound. Social scientists have recently argued, 
consistent with Rahman’s framework and this analysis, that state-run 
grocery stores should be considered an option for meeting national food 
needs.296 The authors point to state-run alcohol stores as an illustration of 
the fact that our legal-economic traditions do already account for such an 
approach.297 The authors also acknowledge that such an initiative would 
require a thicker conception of the role for policy to intervene into markets 
and recalibrate the balance between private interests and public ones, 
shifting the scale more towards the latter.298 
Thus, an initial step for understanding the role for economic regulation 
in rural America is that rural diseconomies of scale mean that the concept 
of “infrastructure” may need to take up more space than it would in a place 
with higher population density, depending upon how one wants to define 
whether a particular sector needs to operate “at scale”—which, in a sense, 
any profit-making enterprise does. Other examples of goods and services 
that should be considered infrastructure in a rural setting may include access 
to primary care physicians and lawyers, access to a gas station within a 
reasonable distance, and access to a pharmacy. Of course, rural 
communities are already challenged to access the goods and services widely 
accepted as traditional infrastructure, including building code enforcement, 
police protection, schools, libraries, and clean water.299 These conditions 
alone suggest the need for more robust intervention into these sectors in 
order to ensure that residents’ basic needs are met. Some today would argue 
that policy does not have a role to play in meeting basic needs anymore. But 
this Article’s discussion highlights the fact that such a view is in fact the 
novel and radical one, while economic regulation with a view to the public 
interest has far deeper and more longstanding roots in the U.S. legal 
tradition.300  
How might we apply Rahman’s framework to the more traditional, 
national-network sectors of telecommunications and transportation as they 
concern rural communities today? Both clearly meet the conditions to 
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constitute “infrastructure”: both require scale; both are fundamental 
gateways to almost unquantifiable downstream uses; and both may be 
influenced by private caprice or domination.301 Thus, in this context, the 
trickier question lies in the choices among the tools: what role is there for 
regulatory oversight, structural regulation, or a public option—or perhaps 
other approaches—for addressing the urban/rural digital divide and the gap 
in access to affordable, reliable transportation?  
Far more attention of late has focused on the question of deploying 
broadband internet to rural areas than the question of rural transportation 
access. The legal framework today is still based on the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, which established the general mandate to “promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher 
quality services” and “encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies.”302 Under the Act, the FCC regulates two 
types of entity: (1) telecommunications carriers and (2) information-service 
providers. This distinction is quite important; telecommunications services 
are still bound by the Communications Act of 1934’s regulations for 
common carriers, involving more stringent obligations to strive for 
universal service at just and reasonable rates. 303  Although the FCC 
categorized broadband as an information service in a controversial 2000 
decision, it reversed course in 2015, a decision which broadband service 
providers unsuccessfully challenged.304 
These developments may have seemed like they were going in the right 
direction for rural access. But in 2018, the Trump administration’s FCC 
published its rule repealing net neutrality and recategorizing broadband as 
an information service.305 Significantly for rural communities, this repeal 
reversing broadband’s status as a public utility minimized its importance to 
the public. 306  Advocates of rural development emphasized rural 
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communities’ particular vulnerability to higher rates dictated by “a cash-
driven internet.” 307  This change placed rural small businesses at a 
competitive disadvantaged and made it more likely for local, independent 
service providers to be priced out of competition.308 
Thus, the obvious choice in the context of broadband infrastructure is 
that broadband must be considered just that: infrastructure, or in other 
words, a public utility. But it is not clear that arguably outdated common 
carrier standards would go far enough to ensure adequate rural access. The 
most ambitious legislative proposal to date arguably embodies Rahman’s 
third tool, or placing more of infrastructure provision directly into public 
hands. The proposed Rural Broadband Improvement Act of 2007 would 
have amended the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 to create an Office of 
Rural Broadband Initiatives within the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
established an Undersecretary for Rural Broadband Initiatives, and 
conducted nationwide outreach to rural areas with a view to marshaling 
federal resources to achieve deployment. 309  This, perhaps is what a 
modernized vision for rural infrastructure looks like, drawing on past 
models based on today’s needs and resources. 
In the transportation context, Lisa Pruitt has consistently argued that 
inequitable access to transportation is a critical, underappreciated aspect of 
rural marginalization.310 But few have examined the legal structures shaping 
today’s rural transportation networks. This may be because modern 
transportation law is relatively esoteric and technical. Legislation passed in 
recent, post-deregulation decades—including the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st 
Century, and the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for 
the 21st Century—established frameworks for statewide planning for the 
first time in the history of national transportation law.311 The most recent 
development in this area is the U.S. Department of Transportation’s rule on 
Statewide and Nonmetropolitan Transportation Planning and Metropolitan 
Transportation Planning, finalized and published in May 2016, which 
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Overall, the modern trend has been toward devolved, coordinated planning 
at the regional, state, and local level. One federal report described the rural 
transportation system as “really a system of disparate parts” and “very 
decentralized,” with “actual operations . . . primarily a local 
responsibility.”313 
On its face, this seems problematic from the perspective of national 
infrastructure. Although avenues for local input are certainly desirable,314 
national networks such as highways, airlines, and trains are unlikely to be 
managed well or with a view to equitable access if they are navigating 
(literally) differing patchworks of laws across jurisdictions.315 This need for 
uniformity, consistency, and contemplation of transportation infrastructure 
beyond local and regional transit speaks to the need for heavier federal 
involvement. It seems, therefore, as if Rahman’s first tool—the legacy 
approach of increased regulatory oversight—would be the appropriate 
approach in the transportation context. 
Interestingly, at least two of Rahman’s tools start to emerge as steps in a 
decision-making flowchart: where private markets or devolved decision-
making are failing, as in the transportation context, increased federal 
regulatory oversight is a natural first step. Where regulatory oversight has 
been failing, as in the telecommunications context, increased direct public 
involvement in service provision seems like a natural second step. Both 
reveal points on a spectrum of beginning to tilt the scale, as it becomes clear 
that such tilting is needed, in the direction of the public interest over private 
interests. 
In any case, these three examples—telecommunications, transportation, 
and grocery stores—illustrate some of the many forms of infrastructure that 
rural communities need but cannot necessarily access organically through 
market operations. Service providers would, of course, bear additional costs 
associated with increased service provision for rural communities, which 
would likely be less profitable than urban operations. The political tensions 
of the prior regulatory era would be revived if attempts to rein in private 
power were pursued, or if public providers increased competition with 
private ones, as has been shown with modern litigation over broadband 
standards. The question of how to approach rural diseconomies of scale thus 
raises fundamental questions about the role of government and policy in 
shaping daily life; these questions are ultimately questions about what our 
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collective priorities are. In light of the widespread suffering outside the 
country’s urban centers today, the answer simply cannot be that the balance 
that has been struck today is the correct one, either morally or pragmatically. 
CONCLUSION 
The past several decades have revealed that rural communities are not 
self-sustaining. But the natural handicap posed by rural diseconomies of 
scale does not necessitate that rural communities are unsustainable. Rural 
communities are unique. They are at the forefront of most livelihoods that 
deal in large stretches of land and engage with natural resources. Many of 
those livelihoods are in the business of producing or protecting public 
necessities, including food, fibers, energy, wildlife, and ecosystem 
management. Rural communities are also part of a national political 
ecosystem with an interconnected fate. Thus, we neglect, isolate, and 
unravel rural communities to our own collective detriment. 
The prior regulatory era showed that market interventions to overcome 
the challenge posed by diseconomies of scale bore fruit in the form of better-
served, more prosperous rural communities. Rural communities today are 
not necessarily under-served by all markets providing services that would 
fall under the label of “infrastructure.” But rural isolation from national 
transportation and telecommunications networks today, in light of ongoing 
rural importance and harm to rural consumers, should be considered a series 
of market failures. Rural isolation can go even deeper than this, too; 
abandonment by a grocery store can be the nail in the coffin of a particular 
community’s fate. Thus, a broader conception of infrastructure and the role 
for economic regulation is warranted if we are to understand and meet the 
needs of rural America. While reviving the exact models of the past may be 
unrealistic or undesirable, this analysis establishes that modernized 
interventions must be considered in order to weave rural communities back 
into the national fabric of the networks that connect us. 
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